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COVID-19, the Shadow Pandemic, and Access to Justice for Survivors of 
Domestic Violence 
Abstract 
The COVID-19 pandemic has co-existed alongside a far less visible “shadow pandemic” of violence 
against women, with COVID-19 impacting the number and complexity of domestic violence cases and 
enabling new tactics for coercive control. This article provides a preliminary assessment of the extent to 
which Canada’s responses to the COVID-19 pandemic have prioritized the safety of women and children, 
with a focus on the courts and women’s access to justice. We examine court directives and judicial 
decisions triaging which cases would be heard as “urgent,” as well as courts’ decisions on the merits in 
cases involving domestic violence and COVID-19, spanning the areas of family, child welfare, criminal law, 
and civil protection orders. In the sixty-seven reported decisions in our sample, we find very little 
awareness overall of the heightened risks for survivors during COVID-19, in keeping with the pre-
pandemic tendency of decision makers to focus on incident-based physical violence instead of patterns 
of coercive control. Our analysis also suggests that survivors’ ability to prove domestic violence and 
secure court orders that would help to ensure their safety was hampered not only by procedural 
complexity but also by the reduced availability of a range of services—health, counselling, housing, and 
supervised access centres, for example—as a result of COVID-19. The cases further reveal significant 
differences in judicial interpretation of the risks of COVID-19 relative to the risks of domestic violence, 
often depending on the area of law in question. This again aligns with observations of the judicial 
treatment of domestic violence prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, with different and sometimes conflicting 
norms and assumptions prevailing in different legal contexts. We conclude that despite some positive 
government responses and judicial decisions, COVID-19 has further exposed many of the gaps in 
knowledge about domestic violence and in the supports and resources necessary to make women and 
children safe that long pre-dated COVID-19. In addressing the ongoing pandemic of violence against 
women, we offer some suggestions of measures to improve access to justice during this and future 
disasters. 
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ALONGSIDE THE HIGHLY VISIBLE COVID-19 pandemic exists a “shadow 
pandemic” of violence against women. While the term “pandemic” is usually 
ascribed to a global outbreak caused by a strain of a virus previously unknown to 
be circulating in the human population, the United Nations Entity for Gender 
Equality and Empowerment of Women (UN Women) used the term “pandemic” 
as early as 2014 to capture the global pervasiveness of violence against women 
and girls and the high rates of associated morbidity and mortality.1 Tere are 
then, two global pandemics occurring simultaneously: one, COVID-19, highly 
visible and receiving signifcant public attention and resources, and the other, 
violence against women, its prevalence and harms far less visible and eforts to 
address it under-resourced. 
Tese dual pandemics not only co-exist but interact. As Phumzile 
Mlambo-Ngcuka, the Executive Director of UN Women,  made clear when 
announcing the “shadow pandemic” public awareness campaign, “[e]ven before 
the [COVID-19] pandemic, violence against women was one of the most 
1. United Nations, “UN sounds alarm to end ‘global pandemic’ of violence against women” 
(25 November 2014), online: UN News <news.un.org/en/story/2014/11/484692> [perma. 
mobilize to end violence against women,” online: UN Women <www.unwomen.org/en/news/ 
in-focus/end-violence-against-women/2016> [perma.cc/6WNZ-AVY6]. 
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widespread violations of human rights. Since lockdown restrictions, domestic 
violence has multiplied, spreading across the world in a shadow pandemic.”2 
COVID-19 is generating not only new cases of domestic violence and other 
forms of gender-based violence, but more complex cases, and enabling new 
tactics of coercive control.3 Increases in domestic violence cases can be traced 
to the impact of the virus itself, as well as to societal responses to contain the 
virus, such as stay-at-home orders that lock women and children in homes with 
perpetrators, and the inaccessibility of services, including justice-sector services. 
Dubravka Šimonović, the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against 
women, has called on governments to “not allow the extraordinary circumstances 
and restrictive measures against COVID-19 to lead to the violation of women’s 
2. United Nations, “UN Women raises awareness of the shadow pandemic of violence against 
women during COVID-19” (27 May 2020), online: UN Women <www.unwomen.org/en/ 
news/stories/2020/5/press-release-the-shadow-pandemic-of-violence-against-women-during-
covid-19> [perma.cc/L8XP-6ECA] [“UN Women raises awareness”]. In an earlier statement, 
Mlambo-Ngcuka indicated that in the previous twelve months, globally 243 million women 
and girls (aged ffteen to forty-nine years old) had experienced physical or sexual abuse by 
an intimate partner. See United Nations, “Violence against women and girls: the shadow 
pandemic” (6 April 2020), online: UN Women <www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2020/4/ 
statement-ed-phumzile-violence-against-women-during-pandemic> [perma.cc/3VDS-ZLL6]. 
3. Troughout we use the term “domestic violence” (and also “intimate partner violence”) 
to refer to violence perpetrated in the context of adult intimate relationships. While many 
typologies exist that seek to diferentiate between types of domestic violence, there has been 
increasing recognition that domestic violence is often characterized by coercive control. 
Coercive control captures the multiple tactics, in addition to physical and sexual violence, 
used by abusers to control (often through micro-regulation), coerce (through threats and 
other means), and dominate their partners, instilling fear and depriving them of their 
liberty and autonomy. See e.g. Evan Stark, Coercive Control: How Men Entrap Women 
in Personal Life (Oxford University Press, 2009); Jane Wangmann, “Diferent Types of 
Intimate Partner Violence: An Exploration of the Literature” (Australian Domestic & Family 
Violence Clearing House, 2011), online (pdf ): <opus.lib.uts.edu.au/bitstream/10453/194 
66/1/2010006199OK.pdf> [perma.cc/Y6J9-ZFMG]. Women are disproportionately the 
victims of domestic violence, but not all women are equally at risk. Gender intersects with 
other structures of oppression—colonialism, racism, heterosexism, ableism, xenophobia, 
et cetera—to both magnify risks and diminish access to resources and supports. While many 
legal actors calibrate the severity of harm based on discrete incidents of physical violence, 
women often report that the psychological harms engendered by ongoing coercive control 
are the most destructive and enduring. Many of the tactics associated with coercive control 
are also among the key risk factors for lethal violence. Coercive controlling violence also 
creates an environment of on-going stress and tension that can cause multiple harms to a 
child, including by impairing brain development; See Jane EM Callaghan et al, “Beyond 
‘Witnessing’: Children’s Experiences of Coercive Control in Domestic Violence and Abuse” 
(2018) 33 J Interpersonal Violence 1551; Lynn Hecht Schafran, “Domestic Violence, 
Developing Brains, and the Lifespan” (2014) 53 Judges’ J 32. 












right to a life free from violence.”4 Similarly, UN Secretary-General António 
Guterres, observing that “[m]any women under lockdown for [COVID-19] face 
violence where they should be safest: in their homes,” urged “all governments to 
put women’s safety frst as they respond to the [COVID-19] pandemic.”5 
In what follows, we ofer a preliminary assessment of how Canada has fared in 
heeding this advice. Our assessment covers the period from 16 March 2020 (the 
date when many emergency orders went into efect across the country) to 1 June 
2020. While no doubt action is required on many fronts to protect women’s 
safety in the context of these dual pandemics, our focus is on the courts and 
women’s access to justice.6 Our conceptualization of access to justice encompasses 
not only women’s meaningful access to the courts and to legal assistance, but 
more substantively, whether decisions refect an understanding and appropriate 
weighing of the risks of domestic violence, including the heightened risks during 
the COVID-19 pandemic.7 We were interested in court directives prioritizing 
which cases would be heard when physical courthouses and in-person hearings 
came to an abrupt halt, and in how judges were interpreting these directives. 
We were also interested to know whether judges (and counsel) appeared to be 
4. United Nations Human Rights, “States must combat domestic violence in the context of 
COVID-19 lockdowns—UN rights expert” (27 March 2020), online: UN Human Rights 
News and Events <www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=
25749&LangID=E> [perma.cc/6MMK-JVGZ] [UNHR, “States must combat domestic 
violence”]; United Nations, “UN supporting ‘trapped’ domestic violence victims during 
COVID-19 pandemic” (12 June 2020), online: UN, Department of Global Communications
<www.un.org/en/coronavirus/un-supporting-%E2%80%98trapped%E2%80%99-domestic-
violence-victims-during-covid-19-pandemic> [perma.cc/E28S-HAVZ] [UN, “Supporting 
victims during COVID-19”]. 
5. UN, “Supporting victims during COVID-19,” supra note 4, citing António Guterres, 
“Peace is not just the absence of war. …Today I appeal for peace in homes around 
the world. …” (5 April 2020 at 21:30), online: Twitter <twitter.com/antonioguterres/ 
status/1246973397759819776> [perma.cc/7TTY-FRGP]. 
6. Te impacts on women’s access to justice and more particularly, whether courts are open 
and providing protection and decisions in cases of domestic violence, are one of a number 
of issues that the Special Rapporteur has requested information about from states and civil 
society organization. See United Nations Human Rights, “Call for Submissions: COVID-19 
and the increase in domestic violence against women,” online: UN Human Rights Special 
Rapporteur on Women <www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Women/SRWomen/Pages/call_covid19. 
aspx> [perma.cc/5NVQ-WUGX]. 
7. For a fuller discussion of access to justice in the context of domestic violence see Jennifer 
Koshan, Janet Mosher & Wanda Wiegers, “Te Costs of Justice in Domestic Violence Cases: 
Mapping Canadian Law and Policy,” in Trevor Farrow & Les Jacobs, eds, Te Justice Crisis: 
Te Cost and Value of Accessing Law (UBC Press, 2020), online: <ssrn.com/abstract=
3598277> [perma.cc/4752-323H] [Koshan, Mosher & Wiegers, “Te Costs of Justice”]. 
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cognizant of the heightened risks of domestic violence and the COVID-19 
related tactics being used by abusive partners, and how they were assessing the 
risks posed by COVID-19 in comparison to those posed by domestic violence. 
Since proceedings in family, child welfare, criminal law, and to secure civil 
protection orders are the domains with which survivors of domestic violence 
most frequently engage, we have focused on judicial decisions rendered during 
this time period in these areas. Restricting our search to only those cases where 
there was an allegation or fnding of domestic violence yielded a total of just 
sixty-seven decisions. 
Given the timeframe of our search it is not surprising that most of the 
reported decisions involved allegations (or fndings) of domestic violence that 
had occurred prior to the pandemic. Yet the ongoing risks of domestic violence 
and the heightened risks in the context of COVID-19 ought nonetheless to be 
relevant considerations in the context of cases involving, for example, judicial 
interim release, civil protection orders, and custody and access arrangements. 
While the judicial decisions are important and revelatory in many respects, 
there are a great many questions that they leave unanswered and we have fagged 
many of these in later sections of the article, noting as well the data that needs to 
be gathered in order to answer them. For example, while there is some indication 
that requests for Emergency Protection Orders (EPO(s)) have gone up in Alberta 
post COVID-19 and that requests for family law restraining orders are lower 
than anticipated in Ontario, good data on the numbers of applications and 
orders is required. Similarly, while there are many indications that calls to police 
for assistance related to domestic violence have gone up in many parts of the 
country, to date little information is available about how policing, charging, and 
prosecutorial practices may have changed during the pandemic and how these 
may, in turn, flter the sorts of cases that ultimately make their way into reported 
decisions over the months to come. 
Nonetheless, our assessment of the sixty-seven decisions issued in this period 
does provide several insights. Importantly, court directives across the country 
have prioritized “urgent” cases, often explicitly including access to various forms 
of protective orders for victims of domestic violence and in some jurisdictions, 
modifcations in legal aid eligibility and services have been implemented to 
facilitate access to legal advice and representation. However, overall the cases 
reveal very little awareness of the heightened risks for survivors as a result of 
COVID-19. Tough disappointing, in some respects this is not surprising. Te 
tendency of decision makers in all areas of the law to focus on incident-based 
physical violence rather than patterns of coercive control has been documented 






and critiqued for some time; that the novel tactics of coercive control now 
being deployed should escape notice is entirely consistent with this tendency. 
Particularly in the family law context, the strict interpretation of “urgency,” the 
urging by courts for parties to work things out on their own, and the signifcant 
procedural complexity accompanying virtual motions may well be operating to 
limit survivors’ access to the custody and access arrangements and protection 
orders that might shield them and their children from on-going domestic violence. 
Te cases also reveal signifcant diferences in the interpretation of the 
risks of COVID-19 and of these risks relative to those of domestic violence. 
In the criminal law context, while there are clearly diferent approaches taken 
by various judges charged to determine judicial interim release, the harms of 
COVID-19 are often described as dire, unprecedented, and potentially deadly. 
Similarly, in the child welfare context, the risks of COVID-19 are seen to provide 
ample justifcation to end access by biological parents to a child in foster care. 
By contrast, in the family law decisions, descriptions of the risks of COVID-19 
are far more muted. Although superfcial note is made of public health directives 
limiting contact, the risks of having children regularly moving back-and-forth 
between households never register as being terribly signifcant and they pale in 
comparison to the importance courts attach to maintaining contact with both 
parents. And while in many of the criminal cases there is an explicit balancing 
of the risks of COVID-19 and the risks of violence to the complainant, in the 
family law cases the risks of domestic violence are minimized alongside the 
minimization of the risks of COVID-19. While the risks of congregate living in 
jails certainly difer from those attendant on moving between two households, 
there is a signifcant qualitative diference in how COVID-19 and its risks are 
described and weighed in decision making. Moreover, the diferences between 
the family and child welfare decisions cannot be explained by these variants 
in living conditions. Rather these diferent approaches, we suggest, are better 
explained by Marianne Hester’s theory of three planets, each with its own set of 
norms, particular understanding of and assumptions about domestic violence, 
and legislative frameworks. Te norms and assumptions associated with one 
planet—criminal law, for example—are not merely distinct from, but often in 
tension or direct confict with, those associated with the other planets—family 
law and child welfare law. Tese tensions and contradictions result in the lack of 
a coherent approach and serve to undermine the safety of women and children.8 
8. Marianne Hester, “Te Tree Planet Model: Towards an Understanding of Contradictions in 
Approaches to Women and Children’s Safety in Contexts of Domestic Violence” (2011) 41 
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In Part I we explore in some detail the emerging data on COVID-19 and 
domestic violence. We briefy consider the data not only from Canada, but 
elsewhere around the globe, to make clear why violence against women has 
been characterized as a pandemic. Here we consider not only the rise in rates 
of domestic violence, but in its severity and complexity. We then consider the 
multiple pathways that connect the COVID-19 pandemic and the violence 
against women pandemic. Before turning to the consideration of how courts 
have responded, we briefy canvass the difculties women are experiencing in 
accessing counselling, health, and shelter services. While these are important in 
their own right, they also have implications for women’s participation in court 
proceedings, including whether they are able to provide the evidence to establish 
domestic violence. Te limited availability of shelter beds, of rehabilitation and 
child welfare services, and the closing of supervised access centres also leave 
their imprint on judicial decision making. Te fnal issue we address in this part 
is the availability of legal advice and representation and the specifc measures 
introduced in some provinces and territories to facilitate survivors’ access to 
justice during the pandemic. 
In Part II we frst describe the methodology used to generate our case sample 
and then turn to a detailed discussion of the reported decisions in family law, child 
welfare law, criminal law, and the laws pertaining to civil protection and restraining 
orders. Here we draw out the themes noted briefy above, highlighting not only 
those emergent in each area of law, but how themes compare across these areas. 
In Part III, the conclusion, we provide an overall assessment of how well 
Canada has done in prioritizing women’s safety in its response to COVID-19. 
While some positive steps have been taken, we suggest that COVID-19 has laid 
bare many of the gaps in knowledge about domestic violence and in the supports 
and resources necessary to make women and children safe that long pre-dated 
COVID-19’s arrival. We ofer a number of suggestions of measures necessary to 
ensure access to justice not only during COVID-19 and other disasters, but to 
address the ongoing pandemic of violence against women. 








I. COVID-19 AND THE SHADOW PANDEMIC OF DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE 
A. THE EMERGING DATA ON COVID-19 AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
Te UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women issued a statement on 
27 March 2020, warning that restrictive measures to fght COVID-19 would 
intensify the risk of domestic violence:9 
It is very likely that rates of widespread domestic violence will increase, as already 
suggested by initial police and hotline reports. For too many women and children, 
home can be a place of fear and abuse. Tat situation worsens considerably in cases 
of isolation such as the lockdowns imposed during the COVID-19 pandemic. … To 
make matters worse, restrictions of movement, fnancial constraints and generalized 
uncertainty embolden perpetrators and provide them with additional power and 
control. 
Reports of increases in domestic violence have continued to proliferate. 
As of the time of writing, many of the reports derive from single data sources, 
such as shelters, hotlines, and police services in various jurisdictions around the 
globe. And as noted by others, systematically gathering national data is extremely 
important, not only during the pandemic but well beyond.10 As with other 
disasters and emergencies, the impact of COVID-19 on the rates, complexity, 
and severity of domestic violence will be felt well beyond the declared “ending” 
of the pandemic.11 
Commentators have described the circumstances of “isolation paired 
with psychological and economic stressors … and increases in negative coping 
9. UNHR, “States must combat domestic violence,” supra note 4. 
10. United Nations Women, “Violence Against Women and Girls: Data Collection during 
COVID-19” (17 April 2020), online (pdf ): <www.unwomen.org/-/media/headquarters/ 
attachments/sections/library/publications/2020/vawg-data-collection-during-covid-19-
compressed.pdf?la=en&vs=2339> [perma.cc/F4XU-RYAK]. 
11. Andrew M Campbell, “An Increasing Risk of Family Violence During the Covid-19 
Pandemic: Strengthening Community Collaborations to Save Lives” (2020) 2 Forensic 
Sci Intl 100090; Caroline Bradbury-Jones & Louise Isham, “Te Pandemic Paradox: Te 
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mechanisms”12 during COVID-19 as a “ticking time bomb,”13 a “powder keg,”14 
and a “perfect storm.”15 Reports from around the globe to date indicate increases 
in the number of calls for assistance related to domestic violence generally ranging 
from 10–50 per cent, with a 25–30 per cent increase being common in many 
countries.16 An American study comparing domestic violence calls to police in 
ffteen large US cities found an increase of 10.2 per cent over the same time 
period last year. Signifcantly, increases were reported in city blocks without a 
recent history of domestic violence, suggesting new households are placing 
calls for assistance.17 In an Australian survey administered over a one-month 
period in April to May 2020 to 166 frontline service providers, 59 per cent of 
respondents reported an increase in the frequency of domestic violence, and 42 
per cent reported that the pandemic had resulted in frst-time family violence 
reported by women.18 
12. Kim Usher et al, “Family Violence and COVID-19: Increased Vulnerability and Reduced 
Options for Support” (2020) 29 Intl J Mental Health Nursing 549 at 550; See also N 
van Gelder et al, “COVID-19: Reducing the Risk of Infection Might Increase the Risk of 
Intimate Partner Violence” (2020) 21 EClinical Medicine 100348. 
13. Caroline Bettinger-Lopez, “A Double Pandemic: Domestic Violence in the Age of 
COVID-19” (13 May 2020), online: Council on Foreign Relations <www.cfr.org/in-brief/ 
double-pandemic-domestic-violence-age-covid-19> [perma.cc/S9W8-AK7R]. 
14. Raisa Patel, “Minister says COVID-19 is Empowering Domestic Violence Abusers as 
Rates Rise in Parts of Canada” (27 April 2020), online: CBC <cbc.ca/news/politics/ 
domestic-violence-rates-rising-due-to-covid19-1.5545851> [perma.cc/Z2ZE-KXKY]. 
15. UN, “Supporting victims during COVID-19,” supra note 4, citing UN Women Executive 
Director Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka; See Usher, supra note 12. 
16. For a review of rates reported in various countries, see “COVID-19 and Ending Violence 
Against Women and Girls” (2020) at 2-3, online (pdf ): UN Women <https://www.unwomen. 
org/-/media/headquarters/attachments/sections/library/publications/2020/issue-brief-covid-
19-and-ending-violence-against-women-and-girls-en.pdf?la=en&vs=5006> [perma. 
cc/7V9K-6XE4]; Brad Boserup, Mark McKenney & Adel Elkbuli, “Alarming Trends in US 
Domestic Violence During the COVID-19 Pandemic,” (2020) Am J Emergency Medicine. 
In the United Kingdom, Respect, a domestic violence charity, reported a 97 per cent increase 
in calls, a 185 per cent increase in emails, and a 581 per cent increase in website visits. See 
UN, “Supporting victims during COVID-19,” supra note 4. 
17. Emily Leslie & Riley Wilson, “Sheltering in Place and Domestic Violence: Evidence from 
Calls for Service during COVID-19” (19 May 2020), online: <papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=3600646> [perma.cc/27XZ-6NWS]. 
18. Naomi Pftzner, Kate Fitz-Gibbon & Jacqui True, “Responding to the ‘Shadow Pandemic’: 
Practitioner Views on the Nature and Responses to Violence Against Women in Victoria, 












In the Canadian context Maryam Monsef, the Federal Minister for Women 
and Gender Equality, reported on 27 April 2020 that consultations with frontline 
organizations revealed a 20–30 per cent increase in rates of domestic violence in 
some regions in Canada, and in the case of one shelter in the Greater Toronto 
Region, a 400 per cent increase in calls for assistance.19 Vancouver’s Battered 
Women’s Support Services reported in early April 2020 a 300 per cent increase in 
calls over the prior three week period.20 Various police forces have also reported 
an increase in domestic violence calls21 and a Statistics Canada survey of 4,600 
Canadians conducted between 29 March 2020 and 3 April 2020 found that 
10 per cent of women reported being very or extremely concerned about the 
possibility of violence in the home, as did 6 per cent of men.22 
While limited data exists to date on rates of violence during COVID-19 
against women who experience multiple and intersecting forms of oppression, 
a recent report from Human Rights Watch documents the heightened risks of 
gender-based violence for older women, women with disabilities (particularly 
those who are institutionalized, where shelter-in-place orders can make detection 
of abuse extremely difcult), foreign domestic workers (who are often locked 
in households and have no or limited access to public safety nets), and women 
19. Patel, supra note 14. See also Wendy Gillis, “Forced to stay home with their abusers, 
Canadian victims of domestic violence must ‘choose between two pandemics’” 
(20 April 2020), online: Te Toronto Star <www.thestar.com/news/canada/2020/04/20/ 
forced-to-stay-home-with-their-abusers-canadian-victims-of-domestic-violence-must-
choose-between-two-pandemics.html> [perma.cc/NML8-VGP3]; Deepa Mattoo & Alina 
Butt, “Re: United Nations Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women—Call for 
Submissions: COVID-19 and the Increase of Domestic Violence Against Women” (30 June 
2020), online (pdf ): Barbara Schlifer Commemorative Clinic <www.schliferclinic.com/ 
wp-content/uploads/2020/07/UN-Submission-re-COVID-19-and-VAW-June-30-2020-1. 
pdf> [perma.cc/S2YZ-5KD5]. 
20. Rumina Daya & Jon Azpiri, “Calls to Vancouver domestic-violence crisis line spike 300% 
amid COVID-19 pandemic” (7 April 2020), online: Global News <www.globalnews.ca/ 
news/6789403/domestic-violence-coronavirus/> [perma.cc/XF2M-DMY2]. 
21. For example, police in Saskatoon reported 484 domestic violence calls in March 2020 by 
comparison to 359 in 2019; See Brady Lang, “Saskatoon police sees drop in dispatched 
calls in March, domestic violence calls up” (14 April 2020), online: 650 CKOM <www. 
ckom.com/2020/04/14/saskatoon-police-sees-drop-in-dispatched-calls-in-march-domestic-
violence-calls-up/> [perma.cc/ZYX7-9T86]. 
22. Statistics Canada, Canadian Perspectives Survey Series 1: Impacts of COVID-19, Catalogue No 
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without or with limited access to technology.23 In Canada, the Native Women’s 
Association has raised concern about the spike in the number of Indigenous 
women facing violence, noting that of 250 Indigenous women surveyed, 
1 in 5 reported experiencing physical or psychological violence since the 
pandemic began.24 Concerns have also been sounded about the particular and 
exacerbated vulnerabilities during COVID-19 for non-status migrant women.25 
Although these are early fndings, they are entirely consistent with historical 
data documenting the diferential burden of pandemics, with marginalized 
communities bearing the brunt.26 
23. Human Rights Watch, “Submission to the UN special rapporteur on violence against 
women, its causes and consequences regarding COVID-19 and the increase in domestic 
violence against women” (3 July 2020), online: Human Rights Watch News <www.hrw.org/ 
news/2020/07/03/submission-un-special-rapporteur-violence-against-women-its-causes-and-
consequences#_ftn1> [perma.cc/CC9U-E3FQ]. Tese concerns have also been expressed 
by Special Rapporteur Simonovic. See United Nations Human Rights “States must combat 
domestic violence in the context of COVID-19 lockdowns 00 UN Rights Expert” (27 March 
2020), online: UN Human Rights News and Events <www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/ 
DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25749&LangID=E> [perma.cc/L9WW-JTPW]. 
24. Teresa Wright, “Violence against Indigenous women during COVID-19 sparks calls 
for MMIWG plan” (10 May 2020), online: CBC <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/ 
violence-against-indigenous-women-action-plan-covid-19-mmiwg-1.5563528> 
[perma.cc/QSW4-W4ND]. 
25. Salina Abji, Margarita Pintin-Perez & Rupaleem Bhuyan, “In Canada, non-status women 
are being left behind” (27 May 2020), online: Open Democracy <www.opendemocracy. 
net/en/pandemic-border/canada-non-status-women-are-being-left-behind/> 
[perma.cc/CKR2-ZNAF]. 
26. See e.g. Ruqaiijah Yearby & Seema Mohapatra, “Law, Structural Racism, and the COVID-19 
Pandemic” (2020) Saint Louis University School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, 
No 2020-08, online: <academic.oup.com/jlb/article/doi/10.1093/jlb/lsaa036/5849058> 
[perma.cc/7VJR-3ZZ3]; Janet E Mosher, “Accessing Justice Amid Contagion” (2014) 51 
Osgoode Hall LJ 919; Lawrence O Gostin & Alexandra Phelan, “Te Ebola Epidemic: 
A Global Health Emergency” (2014) 312 J Am Medical A 1095; Harvey Kayman & Angeal 
Ablorh-Odjidja, “Revisiting Public Health Preparedness: Incorporating Social Justice 
Principles in Pandemic Preparedness Panning for Infuenza” (2006) 12 J Pub Health Mgmt 
& Prac 373; Jonathan Purtle, “Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Post-Disaster Mental Health: 
Examining the Evidence Trough a Lens of Social Justice” (2012) 19 Wash & Lee J CR 
& Soc Just 31; Kathleen Tierney, “Social Inequality, Hazards, and Disasters” in Roland 
J Daniels et al, eds, On Risk and Disaster: Lessons from Hurricane Katrina (University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2006) 109. Te strength of the association between income status and 
death led many commentators to estimate post-SARS that of the sixty-two million deaths 
projected for the next major infuenza pandemic, an astounding 96 per cent would be in low- 
and middle-income areas, whether domestically or globally. In Canada, 25.65 per cent of 
those hospitalized during the H1N1 outbreak in 2008 were of Aboriginal ancestry, yet they 
comprised only 4 per cent of the population. During the infuenza pandemic of 1918-19 the 








But not all agencies, shelters, and police services are reporting increases, and 
even where increases are reported there is very good reason to think that the 
currently reported numbers do not represent the full scope of the problem.27 
Most women do not report to police; they are far more likely to turn to informal 
mechanisms of support, including family and friends.28 Moreover, in the current 
context where many women are (or have been until recently) isolated in their 
homes with their abusers and where their phone and internet use is closely 
monitored, the ability to reach out for support and advice can be extraordinarily 
limited and attempts to do so, dangerous. Additionally, given the rapid pace of 
change, the closure of all but essential services, and the plea by public health 
ofcials to remain at home, it was no doubt difcult for women to discern what 
services were still operating.29 
In addition to the impact on the rates of domestic violence, increases in 
severity and complexity have been reported. In the Australian survey noted 
above, 50 per cent of respondents reported an increase in the severity of family 
violence and 55 per cent reported an increase in complexity. Disturbingly, from 
some jurisdictions, including Canada, there have been reports of an increase 
death for Aboriginal peoples was fve times the rate of non-Aboriginal persons; for further 
discussion, see Mosher, supra note 26. 
27. Laurie Pawlitza, “No surge in domestic violence cases during COVID-19 lockdown – 
that doesn’t mean it’s not happening” (2 June 2020), online: Financial Post <business. 
fnancialpost.com/legal-post/no-surge-in-domestic-violence-cases-during-covid-19-
lockdown-but-its-happening> [perma.cc/FHE3-2Q4C]; National Domestic Violence 
Hotline, “A Snapshot of Domestic Violence During COVID-19” (5 June 2020), online: 
<www.thehotline.org/2020/06/05/a-snapshot-of-domestic-violence-during-covid-19/> 
[perma.cc/M5UH-MAJS]. 
28. According to Statistics Canada’s 2014 General Social Survey on victimization, 19 per 
cent of victims of spousal violence contacted the police themselves (a further 10 per cent 
reported the police learned of the violence in some other way); See Statistics Canada, 
Family Violence in Canada: A Statistical Profle, 2014, Catalogue No 85-002-X (Juristat, 
21 January 2012) at 10. 
29. See e.g. CBC News, “YWCA director concerned after family violence shelter use drops to 
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in the number of cases of strangulation and of intimate femicide.30 Te UN 
cautions that violence against women is taking on a new complexity: Exposure 
to COVID-19 is being used as a threat and “[a]busers are exploiting the inability 
of women to call for help or escape and women risk being thrown out on the 
street with nowhere to go.”31 A variety of other COVID-19 specifc tactics of 
power and control have also been reported: the use of misinformation about the 
virus to frighten and control victims; the withholding of necessary safety items, 
such as hand sanitizer and disinfectants; preventing access to medical advice 
and services by invoking exposure to the virus; the withholding of economic 
support; forbidding handwashing; denying access to communication methods; 
and preventing women from leaving home to work citing infection concerns, 
or accusing women of attempting to infect them if women have left the home 
for work.32 Frontline service providers in the Australian survey reported that 
30. Pftzner, Fitz-Gibbon & True, supra note 18. On average one woman is killed by her intimate 
partner every six days in Canada but in the frst month of the pandemic at least nine women 
and girls were killed in likely domestic homicides; See Molly Hayes, “At least nine women 
and girls killed in domestic homicides in Canada during pandemic” (last updated 13 May 
2020), online: Te Globe and Mail: Crime and Justice <www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/ 
article-at-least-nine-women-and-girls-killed-in-domestic-homicides-in-canada/> [perma.cc/ 
VNH8-FE3J]; Jamie Grierson, “Domestic abuse killings ‘more than double’ amid Covid-19 
lockdown” (15 April 2020), online: Te Guardian: Domestic Violence <www.theguardian.com/ 
society/2020/apr/15/domestic-abuse-killings-more-than-double-amid-covid-19-lockdown> 
[perma.cc/TBE3-C8PG]. 
31. Michelle Milford Morse & Grace Anderson, “Te Shadow Pandemic: How the COVID-19 
Crisis is Exacerbating Gender Inequality” (14 April 2020), online: United Nations Foundation 
<unfoundation.org/blog/post/shadow-pandemic-how-covid19-crisis-exacerbating-gender-
inequality/> [perma.cc/MC9E-D8QV]. 
32. Pftzner, Fitz-Gibbon & True, supra note 18; Victoria Gibson, “Domestic violence 
organizations laud new funding, but call for more supports as COVID-19 escalates 
risk” (16 April 2020), online: iPolitics <ipolitics.ca/2020/04/16/domestic-violence-
organizations-laud-new-funding-but-call-for-more-supports-as-covid-19-escalates-risk/> 
[perma.cc/JRE4-MJBC]; Campbell, supra note 11; Te Learning Network, University 
of Western Ontario, “Intimate Partner Violence in a Pandemic: COVID-19-Related 
Controlling Behaviours,” online (pdf ): Te Learning Network at the Centre for Research & 
Education on Violence Against Women & Children <www.vawlearningnetwork.ca/our-work/ 
infographics/LN-COVID-19-Related-Controlling-Behaviours-PDF-2.pdf> [perma.cc/ 
B86N-XU68]; Wendy L Patrick, “Domestic Abuse and Quarantine: When the Treat is 
Inside” (19 March 2020) online: Psychology Today <www.psychologytoday.com/ca/blog/ 
why-bad-looks-good/202003/domestic-abuse-during-quarantine-when-the-threat-is-inside> 
[perma.cc/S6YY-AZX2]. 
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perpetrators are using children and COVID-19 as a pretext to gain access to 
women, particularly where shared care arrangements are in place.33 
Te correlation between COVID-19 and domestic violence is bidirectional: 
Not only does COVID-19 increase the risk of domestic violence, but survivors 
are at higher risk of infection, co-morbidities, and long-term consequences of 
the pandemic.34 Moreover, domestic violence harms women’s abilities to recover 
from disasters.35 
B. PATHWAYS LINKING COVID-19 AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
While increases in domestic violence are no doubt an unintended consequence of 
the public health and other measures to contain and respond to COVID-19, they 
are not unanticipated. A signifcant volume of research documents the increases 
in gender-based violence, including domestic violence, during and long after 
pandemics and disasters of various sorts.36 An even larger volume of research has 
revealed the strong correlation between common outcomes produced by such 
events—isolation, stress, unemployment, increased alcohol consumption, and 
deterioration in mental well-being—and domestic violence.37 
A common tactic of coercive controllers is to isolate their victims, cutting 
them of socially (from friends and family), physically and geographically 
(restricting their movements, in some instances confning victims to the 
home), and functionally (supports may exist but are unreliable or aligned with 
the perpetrator).38 Emma Williamson’s metaphor of a cage aptly captures the 
33. Pftzner, Fitz-Gibbon & True, supra note 18. Note too, that pandemics are also associated 
with the exacerbation of xenophobia-related violence, harassment, and other forms of 
violence in public spaces. UN Women has observed during COVID-19 an increase in 
online violence against women, as well as increased sexual exploitation and abuse. See “UN 
Women raises awareness,” supra note 2. (“Some groups of women, including human rights 
defenders, women in politics, journalists, bloggers, women belonging to ethnic minorities, 
indigenous women, lesbian, bisexual and transgender women, and women with disabilities 
are particularly targeted by ICT-facilitated violence” (ibid)). 
34. Amber Peterman et al, “Pandemics and Violence Against Women and Children” (1 April 
2020) at 6, online (pdf ): Center for Global Development <www.cgdev.org/sites/default/fles/ 
pandemics-and-vawg-april2.pdf> [perma.cc/Q4TM-U92Z]. 
35. Katie Lauve-Moon & Regardt J Ferreira, “An Exploratory Investigation: Post-Disaster 
Predictors of Intimate Partner Violence” (2017) 45 Clinical Soc Work J 124 at 125. 
36. Ibid; See also Campbell, supra note 11; Peterman et al, supra note 34; Emily W Harville et 
al, “Experience of Hurricane Katrina and Reported Intimate Partner Violence” (2011) 26 J 
Interpersonal Violence 833. 
37. An extensive review of this literature is provided by Peterman et al. See Peterman et 
al, supra note 34. 
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experience of many women living with a coercive controller.39 Locked inside 
the home—physically and psychologically—the abuser’s portrayal of reality 
may be the only portrayal to which a victim has access.40 Quarantine, physical 
distancing, and shelter-in-place public health orders map exquisitely onto an 
abuser’s desire to control his intimate partner, adding yet more authority to his 
edicts and in some jurisdictions, backed by the coercive power of the state that 
can be applied in the event an order is breached. As many advocates have pointed 
out, to be locked inside the home with the perpetrator can be profoundly unsafe 
for women and for children, yet public health messages consistently portray the 
home as the place of safety.41 
Tere is ample evidence that economic insecurity and poverty within the 
family produce stress, which in turn is correlated with domestic violence.42 And 
there is no question that COVID-19 has generated signifcant economic insecurity, 
unemployment, and poverty. But as with virtually all burdens associated with 
pandemics, this burden is not borne equally. Women have been more impacted 
by job loss than men (the monthly decline in employment for women was 
39. “Living in the World of the Domestic Violence Perpetrator: Negotiating the Unreality of 
Coercive Control” (2010) 16 Violence Against Women 1412. 
40. Ibid. See also Stephanie Sweetnam, “Where Do You Tink Domestic Violence Hurts Most?” 
(2013) 19 Violence Against Women 133. 
41. Usher et al, supra note 12. For the literature on the risks to children of coercive control, see 
Callaghan, supra note 3; Schafran, supra note 3; See also S Artz et al, “A Comprehensive 
Review of the Literature on the Impact of Exposure to Intimate Partner Violence for 
Children and Youth” (2014) 5 Intl J Child, Youth & Family Studies 49; L Bancroft, 
J Silverman & D Ritchie, Te Batterer as Parent: Addressing the Impact of Domestic Violence 
on Families (Sage, 2012). Bancroft, Silverman, and Ritchie emphasize how children are 
harmed by the active undermining of their relationship with their primary parent (mother) 
by an abusive parent both before and after separation. Tis ultimately impedes children’s 
recovery from the damaging efects of exposure to abuse as they are better able to deal with 
toxic stress when they have a strong supportive relationship with their primary parent. See 
Center on Developing the Child, Harvard University, “Toxic Stress,” online: Key Concepts 
<developingchild.harvard.edu/science/key-concepts/toxic-stress/> [perma.cc/ZPS6-SAUZ]. 
42. Peterman et al, supra note 34; Campbell, supra note 11; Te Learning Network, University 
of Western Ontario “COVID-19 & Gender-Based Violence in Canada: Key Issues and 
Recommendations” (2020), online (pdf ): Te Learning Network at the Centre for Research 
& Education on Violence Against Women & Children <www.vawlearningnetwork.ca/docs/ 
COVID-gbv-canada-recommendations.pdf> [perma.cc/67P2-J5Z9] [Learning Network, 
“COVID-19 & Gender-Based Violence”]. 









more than twice that of men in March),43 creating greater fnancial dependency. 
Financial dependency, in turn, can make leaving an abusive relationship difcult: 
In the face of potential poverty and homelessness, staying in the relationship 
may seem to be a better choice. Not all women are equally impacted by the 
COVID-19 pandemic and the associated economic crisis; it is women from 
marginalized communities whose work is always precarious and under-valued 
who are most harshly impacted. 
Pandemics, together with associated quarantine, stay-at-home orders or 
public health messaging not to leave the home unless essential, and physical 
distancing measures contribute to problematic coping behaviours (such as drug 
and alcohol consumption), anxiety, and mental health disorders, including 
serious psychological consequences such as depression and post-traumatic stress 
disorder.44 Alcohol, drug abuse, and mental health disorders are also correlated 
with domestic violence.45 
Tese various factors—stress, poor mental health, isolation—are not only 
correlated with domestic violence, but are among the risk factors for lethal violence. 
Ontario’s Domestic Violence Death Review Committee has, over a ffteen-year 
period, reviewed 329 cases involving the deaths of intimate partners in order to 
isolate the common risk factors. Tese factors include various characteristics and 
behaviours on the part of the perpetrator that may be heightened or triggered 
by COVID-19: depression, obsessive behaviour, excessive alcohol and drug use, 
43. See Jolson Lim, “Youth, women, precarious workers bear brunt of COVID-19 job 
losses, Statistics Canada fnds” (9 April 2020), online: iPolitics <ipolitics.ca/2020/04/09/ 
youth-women-precarious-workers-bear-brunt-of-covid-19-job-losses-statistics-canada-fnds/> 
[perma.cc/8QZ7-YGWH]; Statistics Canada, Labour Force Survey, March 2020, Catalogue 
No 11-001-X (Te Daily, 9 April 2020) at 7. Te Statistics Canada fndings are based on the 
Labour Force Survey conducted during the week of March 15 to 21. 
44. N van Gelder et al, supra note 12. 
45. Peterman et al, supra note 34; Learning Network, “COVID-19 & Gender-Based Violence,” 
supra note 42. In a survey undertaken by Statistics Canada in April 2020, 13.6 per cent of 
respondents reported an increase in alcohol consumption, although this data is not broken 
down by gender; Statistics Canada, “Canadian Perspectives,” supra note 22. Across the 
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unemployment, prior attempts to isolate the victim, and control of most or all of 
the victim’s daily activities.46 
C. ACCESSING SERVICES AND SUPPORTS 
While the risk factors for domestic violence have gone up, the ability to access 
services and supports has become more difcult. Many service providers have 
quickly moved a number of counselling, safety planning, mental health, and 
other services to remote delivery, but for survivors who are efectively locked in 
their homes with abusers, and where their phone and internet use is likely to be 
closely monitored, accessing these services may not be possible. Moreover, the 
gender and class digital divide means that many survivors will not have access 
to the technologies that are needed to facilitate access to services.47 Tis is a 
particular concern for women from marginalized communities. Service providers 
in the United Kingdom, for example, have reported that:48 
[T]he Covid-19 crisis has exacerbated a lack of access to services for migrant 
and Black, Asian, and minority ethnic (BAME) women, particularly as resources 
go digital. Representatives of organizations serving these communities say 
that  persistent inequality, including access to the internet,  leads to additional 
difculties in providing services remotely. As one Black feminist service provider 
in Newcastle, England, explained, “Twenty-fve percent of the women we support 
don’t even have a phone, let alone a smart phone. [Digital services] assume a baseline 
of access.” 
Te civil society organizations that provide critical supports to survivors of 
gender-based violence faced challenges in meeting women’s service needs well 
46. Ontario, Ofce of the Chief Coroner, Domestic Violence Death Review 
Committee 2018 Annual Report, (December 2019) (Chair, Deidre Bainbridge), 
at 15, online (pdf ): <www.mcscs.jus.gov.on.ca/sites/default/fles/content/mcscs/docs/ 
DVDRC%202018%20Annual%20Report.pdf>  [perma.cc/Q95R-QNQ9]. Another factor 
is access to or possession of frearms; US data shows an increase in purchases of guns and 
ammunition during COVID-19. On the connection between coercive control and lethal 
violence against children, see Lori Chambers, Deb Zweep & Nadia Verelli, “Paternal Filicide 
and Coercive Control: Reviewing the Evidence in Cotton v Berry” (2018) 51 UBC L Rev 
671; on preventing child homicides in the context of domestic violence, see Katreena Scott et 
al, “Child Homicides in the Context of Domestic Violence: When the Plight of Children is 
Overlooked” in Peter Jafe, Katreena Scott & Anna-Lee Straatman, eds, Preventing Domestic 
Homicides: Lessons Learned from Tragedies (Academic Press, 2020) c8; Katherine Reif & Peter 
Jafe, “Remembering the Forgotten Victims: Child-Related Temes in Domestic Violence 
Fatality Reviews” (2019) 98 Child Abuse & Neglect 104223. 
47. Human Rights Watch, “Submission to the UN,” supra note 23. 
48. Ibid. 







before the pandemic. COVID-19 has generated an increased need for services 
and supports from under-funded organizations that are also having to rapidly 
change their service delivery models. 
Tere is evidence in some of the cases reviewed in Part II, below, that 
survivors’ diminished access to counselling, health, and other services is, as one 
might predict, impairing their ability to seek justice in that they are unable to 
access the sources of evidence often insisted upon to “verify” the abuse, establish 
their credibility, or meet other evidentiary thresholds.49 Te constraints produced 
by COVID-19 in accessing sources of verifcation compound the pre-existing 
challenges that have prevented legal systems from responding efectively to the 
needs of survivors. 
Te ability to access safe shelter—both emergency and long-term—is 
fundamental to the human right of women and children to live free of violence. 
Intimate partner violence is a signifcant cause of women’s homelessness, and 
the threat of homelessness, a reason many women remain in, or return to, 
abusive relationships.50 Seeking safe housing elsewhere has been made difcult 
by various public health orders (including shelter-at-home and quarantine orders 
and travel prohibitions). Tese orders limit the potential for women to move 
in temporarily with family or friends, and also impact their access to violence 
against women shelters. Even prior to the COVID-19 pandemic the need for 
shelter services outstripped beds available; Statistics Canada’s annual snapshot 
survey undertaken 18 April 2018 revealed that on that day, 669 women, 236 
children, and 6 men were turned away, most often because the facility was full. 
Of the women who left a facility on that day, 21 per cent were returning to 
a residence where the perpetrator continued to live.51 And while shelters are a 
vital resource for women experiencing violence, it is also important to note that 
shelters are more accessible to some women than others. In some parts of the 
country there are no shelters, and the option of fying out of one’s community is 
highly unlikely during COVID-19; many shelters are physically inaccessible to 
49. See Peterman et al, supra note 34 (providing an example of how delays in medical testing 
during Ebola resulted in legal cases being thrown out (at 16)). 
50. For documentation of this invisibility in detail, see Kaitlin Schwan et al, “Te State 
of Women’s Housing Need & Homelessness in Canada” (Canadian Observatory on 
Homelessness, June, 2020), online (pdf ): <womenshomelessness.ca/wp-content/uploads/ 
State-of-Womens-Homelessness-Literature-Review.pdf> [perma.cc/5NYT-THL9]. 
51. Statistics Canada, Canadian Residential Facilities for Victims of Abuse, 2017/2018, by Greg 
Moreau, Catalogue No 82-002-X, (Juristat, 17 April 2019), online (pdf ): <www150.statcan. 
gc.ca/n1/pub/85-002-x/2019001/article/00007-eng.htm> [perma.cc/7BVL-9XEW]. 
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women with disabilities, and culturally inaccessible for many Indigenous women 
and immigrant women.52 
Since the pandemic was declared there have been signifcant injections of 
funding for shelters, some specifcally targeted to shelters for domestic violence 
survivors, sexual assault centres, and other frontline service providers who work 
with survivors. Te federal government announced in early April 2020 up to 
thirty million dollars to address the immediate needs of shelters and sexual 
assault centres and a further ten million dollars to support the existing network 
of shelters on First Nations reserves and in the Yukon.53 Various provincial 
and territorial governments have also provided additional fnancial supports, 
although often in a block of funds that include other forms of emergency shelter 
and residential facilities.54 
52. Wright, supra note 24. 
53. Women and Gender Equality Canada, News Release, “Government of Canada supports over 
500 women’s shelters and sexual assault centres during the COVID-19 pandemic” (16 May 
2020), online: Government of Canada <www.canada.ca/en/status-women/news/2020/05/ 
government-of-canada-supports-over-500-womens-shelters-and-sexual-assault-centres-
during-the-covid-19-pandemic.html> [perma.cc/54CL-P6S4]. 
54. For example, Ontario committed up to forty million dollars to support organizations that 
provide residential services for child and youth, people with developmental disabilities, 
and emergency shelters for women and families feeing domestic violence. See, Ontario 
Ministry of Children, Community and Social Services, News Release, “Ontario Protecting 
Vulnerable Ontarians During COVID-19 Outbreak” (4 April 2020), online: Ontario 
Newsroom <news.ontario.ca/mcys/en/2020/04/ontario-protecting-vulnerable-ontarians-
during-covid-19-outbreak.html> [perma.cc/K9CZ-6YEE]; Saskatchewan committed 
$171,000 for emergency shelters. See, Government of Saskatchewan, “Province Announces 
Social Services Pandemic Response” (31 March 2020), online: News and Media <www. 
saskatchewan.ca/government/news-and-media/2020/march/31/social-services-pandemic-
response> [perma.cc/WEW3-85A3]; Nova Scotia, $535,000 for transition houses and 
other organizations that support vulnerable women and their children. See Nicole Munro, 
“Organizations seek funding to house domestic violence victims in HRM hotels during 
pandemic” (16 April 2020), online: Te Chronicle Herald <www.thechronicleherald.ca/ 
news/local/organizations-seek-funding-to-house-domestic-violence-victims-in-hrm-hotels-
during-pandemic-438414/> [perma.cc/6V3K-YCMJ]; Alberta, sixty million dollars toward 
adult homeless shelters, women’s emergency shelters and Family and Community Support 
services program. See CBC News, “‘Tis is a serious moment in our history’: Alberta 
Premier Jason Kenney declares public health emergency” (17 March 2020), online: CBC 
News Edmonton <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/this-is-a-serious-moment-in-our-
history-alberta-premier-jason-kenney-declares-public-health-emergency-1.5500562> [perma. 
cc/53GV-GM3H]; Québec, $2.5 million towards the goal of meeting the increased needs 
of assistance and accommodation organizations for women victims of conjugal violence and 
abused women living with multiple social problems. See Québec, Secrétariat à la condition 
féminine, “COVID-19: 2,5 millions de dollars supplémentaires pour soutenir les victimes 







Importantly, in most provinces and territories shelters have been declared an 
essential service.55 Estimates place the increased calls to shelters from survivors at 
20–40 per cent.56 Shelters have had to profoundly change how they work: fewer 
staf on site, lower volume of intakes to maintain physical distancing, stepped-up 
cleaning, isolation for those infected, screening on intake, moving other services 
online. So, while additional funding is desperately needed, it is hard to imagine 
that it comes anywhere close to meeting the needs of women for shelter where 
they are safe from domestic violence and safe from COVID-19. 
An additional complexity arises where women and children share common 
spaces within a shelter. Some shelters have adopted policies to protect residents 
and staf that preclude leaving and returning. Tis is especially challenging in 
cases where the father has access rights; a child who leaves the shelter may be 
precluded from returning. As far as we have been able to discern, Québec is the 
only province to address this explicitly, passing a directive on 10 April 2020, 
suspending existing custody or access rights in an agreement or order where 
the parent with custody was residing in a shelter for victims that had imposed 
isolation restrictions on residents, although contact was to be maintained through 
other means and subject to a court lifting the suspension (and there are cases in 
our sample where courts were persuaded to do so).57 
de violence” (27 March 2020), online: <www.scf.gouv.qc.ca/nouvelles/communiques/ 
salle-de-presse/detail/news/covid-19-2-5-millions-de-dollars-supplementaires-pour-soutenir-
les-victimes-de-violence/> [perma.cc/EL5Y-KXJ6]. 
55. We were unable to fnd information indicating whether shelters or shelter workers had been 
declared essential for Nunavut, Northwest Territories, and Prince Edward Island. 
56. Wendy Gillis, “Forced to stay home with their abusers, Canadian victims of domestic 
violence must ‘choose between two pandemics” (20 April 2020), online: Toronto Star 
<www.thestar.com/news/canada/2020/04/20/forced-to-stay-home-with-their-abusers-
canadian-victims-of-domestic-violence-must-choose-between-two-pandemics.html> [perma. 
cc/84AX-5P53]; Te Shift, “Conversation on COVID-19 and Women’s Homelessness” (6 
May 2020), online (video): Youtube <www.youtube.com/watch?v=5oYSjSPFark> [https:// 
perma.cc/S8QW-285W]. 
57. Québec, Ministerial Directive 2020-020 of the Minister of Health and Social Services 
(10 April 2020), online (pdf ): <cdn-contenu.quebec.ca/cdn-contenu/adm/min/ 
sante-services-sociaux/publications-adm/lois-reglements/AM_2020-020-anglais. 
pdf?1586613277>. Courts have lifted the suspension where the evidence shows that the 
particular living arrangements of the mother and child do not require them to share common 
areas with other shelter residents. See AB v BA, 2020 QCCS 1324; MW v NM, 2020 
QCCS 1213 [MW v NM]; AL v NB, 2020 QCCS 1192 [AL v NB]; Lafond v Blouin, 2020 
ONSC 2396 [Lafond]. In MW v NM, a mother who resided in a shelter for immigrant 
women obtained provisional sole custody of the nine-month-old child on this basis, with 
internet access to the father. In AL v NB however, the suspension was not lifted because 
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Another critical support to facilitate women’s access to justice is legal advice 
and representation. Legal Aid plans vary signifcantly across the country on many 
dimensions, including the qualifying income thresholds, the areas of law covered, 
and the range of service delivery models (legal information, duty counsel, full 
representation by counsel, et cetera). In New Brunswick (Minister of Health and 
Community Services) v G(J),58 the Supreme Court of Canada held that section 7 
of the Charter is engaged where the state seeks to remove children from parental 
custody and that the principles of fundamental justice require, in some instances, 
state-funded legal representation of the parent. Tis means that parents are 
more likely to have access to counsel for child protection matters than in private 
family law proceedings. In the latter context, for those who meet the low-income 
thresholds, representation by counsel in family law matters involving issues of 
custody and access is, or may be, available under provincial and territorial legal 
aid plans, and some plans explicitly prioritize cases where there is an allegation of 
domestic violence. Funding for representation to secure or review EPOs is also 
available in several provinces. In the pre-COVID context, signifcant numbers of 
litigants were unrepresented in private family law matters, and the challenges of 
self-representation in this arena have been well-documented.59 In the context of 
matters involving domestic violence, mustering the evidence to prove the abuse, 
dealing with the interplay of family, criminal, and child welfare law, and the realities 
of the inequalities in power make self-representation a formidable challenge. 
As such, legal aid pre-COVID, like so much of the infrastructure of supports 
needed to ensure the safety of women and children, was inadequately resourced. 
In the context of COVID-19 and the increased risks to women, several 
provinces appear to have made no changes to legal aid eligibility criteria or to 
services, other than altering how applications for legal aid are to be made.60 
the four-year-old child to wear a mask for fourteen days. In the Ontario case of Lafond, the 
father alleged abuse by the mother and wanted to deny her access because of her residence in 
a shelter; however, she was resident in a separate hotel suite and found able to minimize her 
child’s exposure to other children and abide by the relevant protocols. In all of these cases, 
the focus was on COVID-19 risks and the allegations of domestic violence and its potential 
risks were not addressed. 
58. [1999] 3 SCR 46. 
59. See e.g. Action Committee on Access to Justice, Meaningful Change for Family Justice: 
Beyond Wise Words—Final Report of the Family Justice Working Group (April 2013); Law 
Commission of Ontario, Increasing Access to Family Justice Trough Comprehensive Entry 
Points and Inclusivity (LCO, 2013); Julie MacFarlane, Te National Self-Represented Litigants 
Project: Identifying and Meeting the Needs of Self-Represented Litigants (May 2013). 
60. Our fndings here are based on a review of the websites of legal aid providers in each 
province and territory. 











Te most signifcant exception is Legal Aid Ontario, which quickly announced 
that during the COVID-19 crisis, all legal and fnancial eligibility criteria for 
domestic violence survivors would be waived, and that this would remain in 
efect until further notice.61 Legal Aid Ontario’s website includes a specifc 
acknowledgement that “staying home is not always safe and that during the 
COVID19 crisis, it is important to help survivors protect their personal safety 
and continue providing critical family law services.”62
 Legal Aid Alberta introduced measures specifcally designed to facilitate 
victims’ access to EPOs, with duty counsel working remoting to provide legal 
advice, document preparation, and representation over the phone.63 A new, 
temporary service was also introduced to provide after-hours access (from 3:00 
pm–10:00 pm) for duty counsel to support victims of family violence at hearings 
before a Justice of the Peace. Legal Aid Alberta’s website expressly notes that 
this process was developed “in response to increased demands for Emergency 
Protection Orders,” adding that “[h]aving this extra assistance available to 
victims of domestic violence will make the process of obtaining an Emergency 
Protection Order much less stressful for the clients and improve access to justice 
during COVID-19.” Victims of domestic violence in Alberta also have access to 
a free lawyer to assist with the Queen’s Bench Review process that is necessary to 
determine if the EPO should be confrmed.64 
In British Columbia, Legal Aid BC (Legal Services Society) moved family 
duty counsel and family advice lawyer services from in-person to phone-only.65 
Its “Family Law-Legal Help for People of BC” website, like Ontario’s, speaks 
directly to the concerns raised during COVID-19 if confned at home with an 
abusive partner, and provides self-help videos on how to obtain a protection 
61. Legal Aid Ontario, “Domestic Violence services during COVID-19” (last modifed 
5 August 2020), online: <www.legalaid.on.ca/services/domestic-abuse/> [https:// 
perma.cc/TNY2-9V29]. 
62. Ibid. 
63. Legal Aid Alberta, “Legal Aid Supports for Victims of Family Violence During COVID-19, 
online (pdf ): <www.legalaid.ab.ca/SiteAssets/Pages/default/Support%20for%20Victims
%20of%20Family%20Violence%20During%20COVID-19.pdf> [https://perma.cc/
QU46-JMUP]. 
64. For a further discussion of EPOs see Part III, below. 
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order during COVID-19, along with information about how to access services 
from shelters and crisis lines.66 
Yukon introduced a free independent legal advice (not representation) 
program for victims of domestic violence and sexual assault,67 while Nova Scotia 
introduced service alterations in the family law realm, although not specifcally 
designed to address domestic violence. In addition to new measures to address 
child and spousal support variations during COVID-19, it is providing free 
online chats on family law issues twice per week during a two-hour window 
and expanded telephone family summary advice (which is available to anyone, 
including those not fnancially eligible for other services).68 
Te heightened risk of domestic violence, the expansion of tactics of control, 
and the increased challenges women face in accessing services each and together 
threaten the safety of women and children in signifcant ways and have important 
implications for women’s access to justice. 
II. COURT-BASED DECISION MAKING 
In this Part we turn our attention to law and as noted earlier, particularly those 
areas of law that routinely and profoundly impact the safety of survivors of 
domestic violence: family law, child welfare law, criminal law, and the laws that 
provide for various forms of protection orders.69 Here we review the general 
directives from courts prioritizing what matters would proceed and consider how 
judges have interpreted and applied these directives and more generally, decided 
cases involving domestic violence during the frst six weeks of the COVID-19 
66. Jackie Hong, “Yukon government launches free legal advice program for victims of 
sexual violence” (10 June 2020), online: Yukon News <www.yukon-news.com/news/ 
yukon-government-launches-free-legal-advice-line-for-victims-of-sexual-violence/> 
[perma.cc/42WS-CM36]. 
67. Family Law, “COVID-19 updates—abuse & family violence,” online: Abuse & Family 
Violence <familylaw.lss.bc.ca/abuse-family-violence/covid-19-updates-abuse-family-
violence> [perma.cc/768X-2GQ7]; Legal Aid Nova Scotia, “Expansion of Family Law 
Summary Advice and Online Chats” (26 March 2020), online: News <www.nslegalaid.ca/ 
expansion-of-family-law-summary-advice-and-online-chats/> [perma.cc/3TCG-ME9V]. 
68. Legal Aid Nova Scotia, “Support Variations During COVID-19” (20 May 2020), online: 
News <www.nslegalaid.ca/support-variations-during-covid-19-new-ways-to-help/> 
[perma.cc/8LZL-U255]. 
69. We have separately analyzed cases that involve surveillance and technology-facilitated abuse, 
which cross-cut diferent areas of law. See Jennifer Koshan, Janet Mosher & Wanda Wiegers, 
“COVID-19, Domestic Violence, and Technology-Facilitated Abuse,” online (blog): ABlawg, 
University of Calgary, Faculty of Law <www.ablawg.ca/2020/07/13/covid-19-domestic-
violence-and-technology-facilitated-abuse/> [perma.cc/RDM6-WL74]. 










pandemic. We did not set out to conduct a quantitative analysis of relevant 
cases but rather were interested in knowing whether the decisions refected an 
appreciation of the risks of both the COVID-19 pandemic and of the shadow 
pandemic, and more generally how survivors’ access to justice was impacted. 
A. METHODOLOGY 
For this Part of the article, we searched court directives issued by provincial, 
territorial, and superior courts in all Canadian jurisdictions after the pandemic 
was declared in mid-March, 2020—a period when courts across the country 
were shut down and limited matters were permitted to proceed by way of 
teleconference or other electronic means. We also searched cases on CanLII using 
terms inclusive of domestic violence and the COVID-19 pandemic.70 Te search 
led to sixty-seven relevant cases involving applications made and/or decided 
between 16 March 2020 and 1 June 2020 where there was an allegation or fnding 
of intimate partner violence, even if it occurred before then.71 We counted cases 
as relevant where they dealt with domestic violence issues that were related to 
the pandemic in some way, but did not include cases where the courts simply 
mentioned COVID-19 as relevant to procedure or where COVID-19 did not 
play a role in the decision to hear the case or in the arguments or outcome. 
We also included cases where courts consider whether particular domestic violence 
related matters are “urgent” and eligible to be heard on the merits. Our intention 
was to review the cases to identify issues and approaches that were either helpful 
or problematic for alleged victims of domestic violence. As noted above, most 
of the cases in this timeframe involve domestic violence that allegedly occurred 
before the pandemic and this, together with the anticipated long-term impacts 
of COVID-19 on domestic violence survivors, indicate that case tracking for the 
period subsequent to 1 June 2020 will be important for analyzing whether and 
how the shadow cast by COVID-19 is seen and handled by the courts. 
70. Terms included “family,” “domestic,” “interpersonal violence,” “abuse,” and “no contact,” in 
combination with “COVID 19,” “coronavirus,” “pandemic,” as well as “violence conjugale,” 
“violence familiale” with “COVID,” “pandemie.” We supplemented our list with cases from 
the Luke’s Place database that these search terms did not produce; See Luke’s Place, “Recent 
COVID-19 cases,” online: Archive for Case Law <lukesplace.ca/category/case-law-2/> 
[perma.cc/Z7JT-8SV4]. 
71. Tere were ffty-nine English and eight French decisions that we identifed as relevant after 
reading a larger sample of cases decided between these dates. Tese cases were noted up, 
to July 7, and relevant decisions in the same case are also included in our analysis, even if 
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It is also important to note that there was a great disparity of results from 
diferent Canadian jurisdictions in the number of relevant written decisions 
that we found, with most cases coming from Ontario (50), followed by Québec 
(8), British Columbia (4), Nova Scotia and Newfoundland / Labrador (2 each), 
Alberta (1), and no reported cases from the rest of the provinces and territories. 
While this pattern aligns somewhat with the more populous regions of the country 
with higher overall numbers of COVID-19 infections, it does raise questions as 
to the complete absence or low number of cases in many other provinces and 
territories where the incidence of domestic violence is known to have increased.72 
It may be that courts in some jurisdictions are less likely to produce written 
reasons for decisions during the COVID-19 pandemic. For example, in a webinar 
held in April 2020, the Chief Justice and Associate Chief Justice of the Alberta 
Court of Queen’s Bench indicated that written reasons on “urgency” decisions 
were unlikely because the Court was in triage mode.73 In addition, as noted by 
Pamela Cross, the Legal Director of Luke’s Place in Oshawa, Ontario, “those who 
have consulted with a lawyer are wary of the urgency threshold imposed by the 
courts, even though they need a restraining order or exclusive possession of the 
home.”74 Tese are important issues from an access to justice perspective. Judicial 
decisions—even on questions of urgency—should be publicly available as they 
provide transparency, accountability, and guidance to counsel and clients as to 
what matters will be heard. Written decisions are also an important means of 
combatting perceptions about lack of access to the courts—or perhaps confrming 
them, especially in family law cases where the parties are being urged to “work it 
out” before using the courts’ resources. 
72. We are not in a position to compare these rates with what would otherwise be the typical 
case load at this time of year. However, we know from other case law research pre-pandemic 
that the rates of family cases involving intimate partner violence have been disproportionately 
high in Ontario compared to Saskatchewan and Alberta, even given the diferences in 
population. Tis disparity suggests that further research is needed into the problems survivors 
ordinarily experience in diferent jurisdictions in accessing the courts. 
73. See Jennifer Koshan, “Domestic Violence and Legal Responses to COVID-19 in Alberta” 
(10 April 2020), online (blog): ABlawg <ablawg.ca/2020/04/10/domestic-violence-and-
legal-responses-to-covid-19-in-alberta> [perma.cc/9DE9-LM75]. For a rare family decision 
on urgency in Alberta, see SAS v LMS, 2020 ABQB 287. While this case did not involve 
domestic violence, Justice Robert Graesser noted that the parties should engage in “good 
faith attempts to communicate … and good faith attempts to arrive at reasonable solutions” 
before coming to court during the pandemic, “barring a restraining order or Family 
Protection Order” (at paras 38-39). 
74. Pawlitza, supra note 27. 








Te low numbers of written decisions in some jurisdictions may further 
refect the fact that many of the conditions surrounding the pandemic, including 
the difculty in accessing services as discussed earlier, make it quite likely that 
even cases that would satisfy the courts’ defnitions of urgency are not being 
brought to the courts by survivors of violence. Tis is also cause for concern and 
among the questions for which data ought to be gathered. 
B. FAMILY LAW CASES 
Family law cases made up two-thirds of the cases in our case sample. Such 
claims may proceed under the Divorce Act75 or under provincial or territorial 
family legislation. Recent amendments to the Divorce Act that would add family 
violence as a factor relevant to parenting orders were expected to come into 
force 1 July 2020 but have now been delayed until 1 March 2021 because of the 
COVID-19 pandemic.76 Unlike the current Divorce Act, some provincial statutes 
such as Ontario’s Children’s Law Reform Act expressly mandate consideration of 
family violence in making parenting orders.77 However, most of the forty-three 
family law decisions did not identify whether the claim or order was made under 
the federal or a provincial statute. Although a few decisions dealt with fnancial 
matters such as spousal support and family property, the vast majority of family 
law decisions during the relevant period involved applications for parenting 
orders i.e., custody and access. Te vast majority also involved allegations of 
domestic violence made by women against men, with only fve cases alleging 
abuse by the mother or mutual violence. 
In most of the family cases in our sample, two major issues were generally 
to be determined: whether an additional threshold requirement of urgency had 
been met for a hearing to proceed and if so, what the substantive outcome should 
be on its merits. In relation to both of these issues, the cases generally illustrate 
the continuing appeal of two trends that emerged in the 1970s and have been 
dominant in family law jurisprudence since the 1980s. One such trend has been 
referred to by Noel Semple as the “settlement mission,” to capture the eforts by 
judges in the context of an under-resourced legal system to encourage or pressure 
75. RSC 1985, c 3 (2nd Supp) [Divorce Act]. 
76. Bill C-78, An Act to amend the Divorce Act, the Family Orders and Agreements Enforcement 
Assistance Act and the Garnishment, Attachment and Pension Diversion Act and to make 
consequential amendments to another Act, 1st Sess, 42nd Parl, 2019, (assented to 21 June 
2019) [Divorce Act]. For a critique of this delay, see Pamela Cross, “Justice Delayed,” online 
(blog): <www.pamelacross.ca/justice-delayed/> [perma.cc/P8W7-JS7A]. 
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parties into resolving conficts outside of trials.78 Concerns about the impact of 
the settlement mission in cases of domestic violence have been voiced repeatedly 
by feminist scholars and others who have drawn attention not only to the harms 
that may be experienced in individual cases given power diferentials and safety 
risks, but also to the erosion of public norms through the privatization of justice.79 
Te other equally signifcant trend has been the importance courts have placed 
on “maximum contact” or on maintaining relationships between children and 
both of their parents.80 Here too, feminists have long expressed concern about 
the impact of this emphasis on contact in the context of domestic violence.81 Te 
dominance of both of these normative positions reveals a common failure to fully 
understand domestic violence, the shape it takes post-separation, and the harms 
it imposes on women and children. As suggested in the Introduction, above, 
it is perhaps then not surprising that many of the family law decisions made in 
the course of the COVID-19 pandemic fail to refect the increased risks to women 
and children described in Part I, above, and fail to consider the more subtle and 
complex dynamics of domestic violence. Indeed, the cases reveal much about the 
incredible stronghold these norms have on family law decision-making: courts 
have doubled down on the pressure to settle and have continued to promote 
on-going contact with both parents, notwithstanding the risk of domestic 
violence and the risks of COVID-19. Te assessment of the risks surrounding 
COVID-19 in these family law decisions is particularly jarring when compared 
to the assessment made in several of the child welfare and criminal law cases. 
78. “Mandatory Family Mediation and the Settlement Mission: A Feminist Critique” 
(2012) 24 CJWL 207. 
79. Wanda Wiegers & Michaela Keet, “Collaborative Family Law and Gender Inequalities: 
Balancing Risks and Opportunities” (2008) 46 Osgoode Hall LJ 73; Linda C Neilson, “At 
Clif’s Edge: Judicial Dispute Resolution in Domestic Violence Cases” (2014) 52 Fam Ct 
Rev 529; LC Neilson, Responding to Domestic Violence in Family Law, Civil Protection & 
Child Protection Cases (Canadian Legal Information Institute, 2020) [Neilson, Responding 
to Domestic Violence]; Lesley Laing, “Secondary Victimization: Domestic Violence Survivors 
Navigating the Family Law System” (2017) 23 Violence Against Women 1314; Echo A 
Rivera, Chris M Sullivan & April M Zeoli, “Secondary Victimization of Abused Mothers 
by Family Court Mediators” (2012) 7 Feminist Crim 234; David Greatbatch & Robert 
Dingwall, “Te Marginalization of Domestic Violence in Divorce Mediation” (1999) 13 Intl 
JL Pol’y & Fam 174; Sara Cobb, “Te Domestication of Violence in Mediation” (1997) 31 
Law & Soc’y Rev 397. 
80. See Divorce Act, supra note 76, s 16(1). 
81. See e.g. Susan B Boyd, Child Custody, Law, and Women’s Work (Oxford University Press, 
2003). For similar concerns that have been identifed in other countries, see Rosemary 
Hunter, Adrienne Barnett & Felicity Kaganas, “Introduction: Contact and Domestic Abuse” 
(2018) 40 J Soc Welfare & Fam L 401. 









In Ontario, where most of the cases were decided, court directives for both the 
Ontario Court of Justice and the Superior Court of Justice generally limited family 
court matters as of 17 March 2020 to motions that were urgent.82 According to 
the Superior Court’s Directive, urgent matters included “urgent relief relating 
to the safety of a child or parent” (e.g., restraining orders, exclusive possession 
orders), those related to “the well-being of a child” including “the wrongful 
removal or retention of a child,” and “dire issues regarding the parties’ fnancial 
circumstances” (e.g., non-depletion orders).83 Tis directive was amended over 
time and further notices to the profession that had been issued in diferent regions 
were consolidated in a province-wide directive efective 19 May 2020.84 Tese 
directives are substantially similar to those issued in other jurisdictions, most of 
which have limited motions to urgent or emergency situations, including safety 
concerns arising from a risk of violence or immediate harm to a party or child.85 
82. For a list of diferent directives of the Ontario Court of Justice over time, see Luke’s Place, 
“Supporting women to access family law supports during COVID-19” (24 June 2020), 
online: Service Providers, Legal News & Strategy <lukesplace.ca/supporting-women-to-access-
family-law-supports-during-covid-19/#OCJ> [perma.cc/8XRP-8WWS]. 
83. “Notice to the Profession, the Public and the Media Regarding Civil and Family Proceedings: 
Suspension of Superior Court of Justice Regular Operations” (15 March 2020), online: 
Superior Court of Justice <www.ontariocourts.ca/scj/covid-19-suspension-fam/> [perma. 
cc/258D-U3K9] [Notice to the Profession, 15 March 2020]. 
84. See Ontario Superior Court of Justice, “Consolidated Notice to the Profession, Litigants, 
Accused Persons, Public and the Media” (13 May 2020), online: Notices and Orders— 
COVID-19 <www.ontariocourts.ca/scj/notices-and-orders-covid-19/consolidated-notice/> 
[perma.cc/L5L8-KR3X] [Ontario Superior Court of Justice, “Consolidated Notice to the 
Profession”]. Subsequently, diferent regions have issued diferent directives with some 
retaining urgency as a threshold requirement and others allowing for the hearing of more 
non-urgent matters while prioritizing urgent or pressing motions. 
85. For directives related to most of the cases within our sample, see British Columbia 
Supreme Court, “Notice to the Profession, the Public and the Media Regarding Civil and 
Family Proceedings COVID-19: Suspension of Regular Court Operations” (30 March 
2020), at 2, online: <s3.amazonaws.com/tld-documents.llnassets.com/0018000/18398/ 
notice%20of%20suspension%20of%20civil%20and%20family%20proceedings%20 
revised%20march%2030,%202020.pdf> [perma.cc/RJC7-D2T6]; Court of Queen’s 
Bench of Alberta, “Master Order #3 Relating to Court’s Response to the COVID 19 
Virus” (21 April 2020), online (pdf ): <www.albertacourts.ca/docs/default-source/qb/covid/ 
master-order-3---covid-19---fnal.pdf?sfvrsn=c4c68280_8> [perma.cc/LT39-CSZW]. 
Québec included safeguard applications and custody and support applications within 
the category of urgent applications. See Justice Québec, Press Release, “Measures to be 
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Te interpretation of these directives by courts in the context of cases 
involving domestic violence, along with the procedures in place to get a matter 
before the courts, reveal potentially signifcant obstacles for survivors in accessing 
justice during COVID-19. According to early cases, fndings of urgency were 
to be made on a preliminary and temporary basis. Urgent rulings are without 
prejudice to either party on the substantive merits of the motion and do not 
displace other statutory requirements or court-based rules.86 In Tomas v 
Wohleber, a leading case which involved allegations by the wife of surveillance 
and fnancial abuse by her husband, Justice Kurz pointed out that the urgency 
requirement must be scrupulously and rigorously enforced.87 Concerns must 
require “immediate” resolution; they must also be serious, “defnite” rather than 
speculative, “material” rather than theoretical, and must be “clearly particularized 
in evidence.”88 Te onus of proving urgency is typically on the party advancing 
the motion in relation to each claim for relief.89 
Te high threshold established in Tomas and the need to demonstrate 
immediate or imminent,90 or material, tangible91 or demonstrable harm, can 
capture discrete and serious instances of fnancial abuse, such as the coerced 
indebtedness in Tomas,92 and may also capture discrete incidents of physical 
violence that are serious and recent. However, a focus on recent instances of 
serious physical or fnancial coercion fails to take account of the assemblage 
of stratagems and behavioural patterns that can, over a longer period, work to 
maintain coercive control. As indicated in our earlier discussion, COVID-19 has 
both expanded the tactics available to perpetrators in maintaining power and 
control and intensifed others, including those that continue post-separation. 
to-covid-19/> [perma.cc/PF4W-RS5D]. Directives varied in diferent courts in most 
jurisdictions and have been modifed over time. 
86. Berube v Berube, 2020 ONSC 2221 [Berube]. Tomas v Wohleber, 2020 ONSC 1965 
[Tomas] (discussing the requirements under the Family Law Rules that would ordinarily 
be required before hearing a formal motion and waiving a case conference, mandatory 
information conference, or allowing an ex parte application (at paras 25-30)). 
87. Tomas, supra note 86. 
88. Ibid at paras 31-33, 38-39. 
89. Tibodeau v Molder, 2020 ONSC 2745 [Tibodeau]. Te list is not exhaustive, and 
the determination of urgency is discretionary. See Kostyrko v Kostyrko, 2020 ONSC 
2190 [Kostyrko]. 
90. See e.g. JW v CH, 2020 BCPC 535. 
91. See e.g. LMB v FJD, 2020 ONCJ 239 [LMB]. In LMB, the judge found there was no 
“tangible evidence” of anger or addiction issues in response to the mother’s evidence that “he 
assaulted me all the time” (ibid at para 87). 
92. Tomas, supra note 86. 
















Since many, if not most, of the parents in our case sample had separated 
before the pandemic, COVID-19 was more likely to be related to eforts in the 
post-separation context to consolidate control over the victim. Although many 
control tactics commonly known to occur post-separation were evident in the 
recitation of facts in the custody or access decisions, the connections to coercive 
control were rarely drawn.93 Tese tactics included attempts to discredit mothers 
as parents by accusing them of using drugs or having mental health issues,94 
or to undermine their relationships with their children by encouraging or forcing 
the children to report mothers to child protection authorities or sign afdavits 
against them,95 or otherwise threatening to take the children away or isolating 
the children from them,96 as well as electronic surveillance,97 a failure to abide 
by previous orders98 and threats of numerous lawsuits.99 Te high threshold for 
urgency thus can constitute a signifcant deterrent to the making and success of 
applications by victims of domestic violence during the pandemic. 
In deciding on urgency, judges have also placed signifcant weight on 
pre-existing parenting arrangements in order to sustain contact between the 
child and both parents. In Ribeiro v Wright, a case that did not involve domestic 
violence but has been frequently cited,100 Justice Pazaratz ruled that “in most 
situations, there is a presumption that existing parenting arrangements and 
schedules should continue, subject to modifcations to ensure that COVID-19 
93. See Te Duluth Model, “Post Separation Power and Control Wheel” (2013), online (pdf ): 
<www.theduluthmodel.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Using-Children-Wheel.pdf> 
[perma.cc/ZG88-RXGT]; For more on legal bullying, see David Ward, “In Her Words: 
Recognizing and Preventing Abusive Litigation Against Domestic Violence Survivors” (2016) 
14 J Soc Just 429; Heather Douglas, “Legal Systems Abuse and Coercive Control” (2018) 18 
Crim & Crim Justice 84. 
94. See e.g. AMD v KG, 2020 ABQB 325 [AMD]. In AMD the mother claimed abuse over a 
ffteen-year period. 
95. See e.g. McCumber v Barnes, 2020 ONSC 2706 [McCumber]. 
96. AMD, supra note 94. 
97. Pappas v Volavka, 2020 ONSC 2856 [Pappas] (acknowledged by the father); Tomas, supra
note 86 (alleged through Spyware); AMD, supra note 94 (describing where the father had 
installed “intrusive camera-monitoring” in the home before separation “to ensure, or help 
ensure, the mother was not neglecting the children” at para 28); See also Triestino v Triestino, 
2020 ONSC 3311 [Triestino, Motion Order]; Triestino v Treistino, 2020 ONSC 3695 
[Triestino, Motion Ruling]. For further discussion see in Part II(E), below. 
98. Triestino, Motion Order, supra note 97 at para 4. 
99. Pappas, supra note 97. Legal bullying was likely not as evident in our case sample since these 
were not fnal judgments based on a trial or on a lengthy history of proceedings. 
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precautions are adhered to, including social distancing.”101 Where a parent had 
denied parenting time or withheld a child simply on account of COVID-19, 
they would then have to present specifc evidence of conduct on the part of 
the other parent that was inconsistent with COVID protocols and that had 
placed the child or another household member at risk. Lacking such evidence, 
the child would continue to move between the two households. Te existence 
of public health directives that favoured a “strict policy of social distancing and 
limiting community interactions as much as possible” were briefy acknowledged 
in Ribeiro, as were the existence and complications of blended families.102 But 
Justice Pazartz did not reference expert testimony on the health implications for 
the child and others arising from the regular or frequent exposure of a child 
to more than one household, nor examine the particular composition of the 
households in question. Instead, he stated:103 
A blanket policy that children should never leave their primary residence—even to 
visit their other parent—is inconsistent with a comprehensive analysis of the best 
interests of the child. In troubling and disorienting times, children need the love, 
guidance and emotional support of both parents, now more than ever. 
Tis assumption, that access should continue across two households, should be 
contrasted with the controversy that emerged when Premier Doug Ford had 
two of his daughters visit his home on Mother’s Day. In this context, the Chief 
Medical Ofcer reiterated that contact should be limited to one’s immediate 
household and that social distancing of two metres should apply to contact with 
all family members outside of one’s household.104 Te ready acceptance of regular 
visits across two households—an approach at odds with the advice of the Chief 
Medical Ofcer—attests to the deep imprint of familial ideology in custody cases. 
101. Ibid at paras 11, 16-17. During the pandemic, the types of orders made by some courts have 
expanded to encompass standard directives such as physical distancing with persons outside 
of each party’s household before, while, and after parenting time, avoidance of unnecessary 
out-of-home errands, frequent handwashing, wearing of masks, and compliance with other 
orders; See e.g. Masse v Phillips, 2020 ONSC 2906 [Masse]; Chahine v Martins, 2020 ONSC 
1825 at para 36. 
102. Ribeiro, supra note 100 at para 8. 
103. Ibid at para 10. 
104. Canadian Press, “Doug Ford appears to contradict ofcial health advice by having daughters 
over” (12 May 2020), online: National Post News Canada <nationalpost.com/news/canada/ 
doug-ford-appears-to-contradict-ofcial-health-advice-by-having-daughters-over-2> [perma. 
cc/F4DE-WVK7]; Sean Davidson, “Ontario premier sparks confusion over social gathering 
rules after weekend visit with daughters” (11 May 2020), online: CTV News Toronto 
<toronto.ctvnews.ca/ontario-premier-sparks-confusion-over-social-gathering-rules-after-
weekend-visit-with-daughters-1.4933644> [perma.cc/62KH-V77Z]. 









Susan B. Boyd, among others, has noted how family courts have restructured but 
also extended the nuclear family unit beyond divorce or separation based largely 
on a presumption that paternal contact is vital to a child’s best interests.105 Te 
notion of a post-divorce family unit also trades on an idealized view of a family 
home as a place of comfort and a refuge from external perils, a view of the home 
no doubt reinforced by public health messaging during COVID-19 but belied by 
the existence of domestic violence. 
In our sample of cases involving allegations or fndings of domestic violence, 
fndings of urgency in applications for access or for the return of children were 
most often seen to relate to the general well-being of a child rather than to their 
or their mother’s safety. Findings of urgency based on a child’s well-being were 
particularly likely where a party had  failed to provide access or failed to return 
a child contrary to an existing order or agreement.106 Where an existing order or 
agreement had not been breached and allegedly abusive fathers sought access, 
case outcomes on the question of urgency were mixed, with some cases fnding no 
urgency because the health, safety, or well-being of the child was not threatened 
in the mother’s care and the fathers had unreasonably delayed in advancing their 
claims.107 However, in most cases, judges found in favour of urgency in order to 
provide some access by fathers, including cases where fathers had been criminally 
charged and subject to no-contact orders vis-à-vis the mothers.108 In several 
decisions, judges did fnd or expressly suspect that fathers were using COVID-19 
to gain a strategic advantage over the mother or impair her relationship with a 
child. In Flesias v Flesias, for example, the father was found to be taking “tactical 
advantage of the pandemic” along with the mother’s “lack of fnancial resources 
and her poor English language skills” in depriving her of access to the family 
105. Boyd, supra note 81 at 134, 222. 
106. See e.g. Kostyrko, supra note 89; Antora v Alam, 2020 ONCJ 220 [Antora]; Berube, supra note 
86; Placha v Bennett, 2020 ONCJ 164 [Placha]. 
107. See e.g. Ramirz-Schrimshaw v Ingram, 2020 ONSC 2278; Reitzel v Reitzel, 2020 ONSC 
1977; Sezin v Sheikh, 2020 ONCJ 187; Clemente v O’Brien, 2020 ONSC 3287 [Clemente] 
(neither urgent nor pressing in part because father had not engaged in settlement discussions 
or proposed options). 
108. See e.g. GJ v B-LS, 2020 ONSC 3115 [GJ v B-LS]; LB-M v MM, 2020 ONSC 1958 
[LB-M]; Amir v Nazir, 2020 ONSC 2459; Pappas, supra note 97; Batchelor v Batchelor, 2020 
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home and to her son over a two-month period.109 Typically, however, the source 
of the urgency or concern has been framed not in terms of a history of domestic 
violence and related risk of harm to a child nor as a tactic used to maintain 
coercive control over a victim, but rather as the failure to support the ongoing 
relationship between the child and the other parent.110 
In the leading cases during the timeframe of our sample, judges have 
also urged the parties to an even greater extent than pre-COVID-19 to work 
matters out themselves before initiating urgent court proceedings.111 Our case 
sample reveals that in many cases, judges simply assumed mothers who had 
alleged assault or domestic abuse should be conciliatory and compromising. For 
example, in Clemente v O’Brien, where the father was charged with assault and 
sought access, the parties were expected, as a pre-condition to obtaining leave 
for an urgent case conference, to have “engaged in genuine, broadly optioned 
and diligent settlement discussions.”112 In Antora v Alam, notwithstanding that 
the father was facing an “outstanding criminal charge”113 and was subject to a 
no-contact order, Judge Clay insisted that through “proper communication of all 
available options” the parties could work out their own adjustments in scheduling 
access.114 Mediation services, available virtually, have been promoted on court 
and government websites although the latter have suggested that mediation “may 
not be a good idea” in cases of violence or abuse or where one party is afraid of the 
other spouse.115 An expectation of respectful communication may be productive 
where partners have ignored or failed to respond to concerns regarding care of the 
109. 2020 ONSC 2368 at para 19 [Flesias]. See also GJ v B-LS, supra note 108 at para 42; 
Edwards v Robinson, 2020 ONSC 3658 at para 6 [Edwards]; McNeil v Christie, 2020 NSSC 
145 at para 13 [McNeil]; McCumber, supra note 95 at para 14. For cases that demonstrated 
a criticism of fathers who withheld children and sought to unilaterally change the status 
quo, see Placha, supra note 106; Kostyrko, supra note 89. But see Ivens v Ivens, 2020 
ONSC 2194 (describing where the father had been “aggressive” towards the mother in 
the past but the mother was found to be using the “crisis as an excuse to usurp parental 
responsibilities” at para 126). 
110. See TP v CS, 2020 ONCJ 210 at para 64 [TP v CS]. See also GJ v B-LS, supra note 108. 
In TP v CS, the problem is also identifed as exposure to parental confict, and in GJ v B-LS 
the disruption of attachment to a primary parent is also of concern. 
111. See e.g. Ribeiro, supra note 100, at paras 22-28, Pazaratz J. 
112. Clemente, supra note 107 at para 33. 
113. Antora, supra note 106 at para 5. See also Jordan v Steel, 2020 ONSC 2834. 
114. Antora, supra note 106 at para 26. 
115. Ontario, Ministry of the Attorney General, Family Mediation Services, online: Family 
Justice <www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/family/mediation.php> [perma.cc/ 
RL2Z-LN5Q]. See also LB-M, supra note 108 (encouraging mediation). 
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children but an expectation of cooperative problem solving may also be wholly 
unrealistic, if not dangerous in cases involving allegations of domestic violence. 
Along with the need to establish urgency, court directives have imposed 
additional and complex procedural requirements on family litigants that make 
accessing justice more difcult, particularly if they are self-representing.116 
In Ontario, urgency is or was to be determined in a separate preliminary 
motion; copies of all relevant orders and endorsements and all relevant facts 
and options were to be included with materials fled for each hearing as judges 
did not have access to physical fles or scanned documents,117 and page limits 
along with time-limited hearings were also imposed in some regional notices. 
Tese requirements have generally presupposed access to a telephone and 
internet service for email communications with court ofcials and electronic 
fling of court documents,118 and in increasing the complexity of the process, 
the requirements have no doubt increased the cost of advancing a claim for 
represented litigants, and the difculties experienced by unrepresented litigants. 
Added procedural complexity itself increases the burden on survivors who may 
have been traumatized by their experience, especially if subject to long term abuse. 
Te onerous urgency threshold established in the case law, the burden 
placed on parties to sort things out themselves, the inattention to the shadow 
pandemic, and the procedural complexity of urgency motions may explain why, 
according to counsel to the Chief Justice of the Superior Court of Ontario, fewer 
motions involving domestic violence were brought in the frst three weeks of 
June than had been anticipated.119 While 45 per cent of urgent cases were family 
and/or child protection matters, and notwithstanding the waiver for victims of 
domestic violence of all legal and fnancial eligibility requirements for legal aid 
in Ontario, “only a handful of those urgent cases dealt with the fallout from 
domestic violence.”120 
116. In our sample of forty-three family cases, thirteen litigants were unrepresented, including 
eight alleged perpetrators and three alleged victims of intimate partner violence. 
117. See e.g. Antora, supra note 106 at para 24. 
118. See Ontario Superior Court of Justice, “Consolidated Notice to the Profession, Litigants, 
Accused Persons, Public and the Media Re: Expanded Operations of Ontario Superior Court 
of Justice, efective 19 May 2020” (13 May 2020), online: Notices and Orders—COVID-19
<www.ontariocourts.ca/scj/notices-and-orders-covid-19/consolidated-notice/#1_Urgent_ 
Civil_and_Family_Proceedings> [perma.cc/3Q77-NX2M]. Hours in which courts were 
open for fling have also varied between regions. 
119. Pawlitza, supra note 27. We note that this reference deals with a time period just outside of 
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2. THE MERITS OF APPLICATIONS 
Judges are to consider only the best interests of a child in deciding applications 
for custody or access. In applying that test in the context of temporary or interim 
applications, they have stressed the importance of maintaining the status quo 
unless there is a compelling reason to change settled parenting arrangements.121 
Te status quo generally means parenting arrangements that existed before the 
separation of the parties, or those in place post-separation by order or agreement 
or for a substantial period of time with the acquiescence of both parties. 
As indicated above, courts have rejected attempts by one party to use COVID-19 
to change the status quo and thereby gain a tactical advantage.122 
Intimate partner violence can provide a compelling reason to alter the 
status quo since the adverse efects of such violence on children have been 
widely acknowledged, even where the violence is not directly witnessed, heard, 
or physically experienced by a child.123 But proving domestic violence is difcult 
where the violence is denied or criminal charges have not yet been prosecuted 
and likely more so during the COVID-19 pandemic when access to various 
sources of evidence that might provide verifcation is extremely limited. In some 
of the cases in our sample, a failure by fathers to respond to domestic violence 
allegations resulted in interim orders favouring mothers.124 In cases where the 
allegation was disputed, some judges made an efort to scrutinize inconsistent 
afdavits and identify which version of events was more credible.125 Others, 
however, simply assumed that each party has their “own version of events, [and] 
whose version is closer to the truth will have to be determined at a later date.”126 
In Amirzada v Alemy, for example, the mother had provided credible evidence 
of a physical assault by choking given criminal charges, hospital care, photos of 
this and prior assaults, along with texts that suggested the father’s “controlling 
121. See e.g. Berube, supra note 86; Ribeiro, supra note 100 at para 11; AMD, supra note 94. 
122. See the text accompanying note 109. 
123. See the text accompanying notes 3, 41, 46. 
124. See e.g. Tibert v Tibert, 2020 ONSC 2972 [Tibert]. In Tibert, the father denied the 
abuse but refused to explain what happened pending the criminal trial, leaving nothing 
to counter the mother’s allegations; Flesias, supra note 109 (noting that such “choices have 
consequences” at para 30); Tibodeau, supra note 89; Soares v Kilgour, 2020 ONSC 2938 
[Soares]. In Soares, the father did not attend the virtual hearing but no adverse inference was 
drawn against him given the limited options available to a court (i.e., involving the locking of 
the virtual hearing) if a self-represented litigant is late for the hearing (ibid at para 7). 
125. See e.g. Flesias, supra note 109; Kostyrko, supra note 89; Soares, supra note 124 (casting doubt 
on the mother’s allegations in this case). 
126. Amiri v Nazer, 2020 ONSC 2459 at para 29 [Amiri]. 




   
 





manner.”127 She alleged that the father had assaulted her while pregnant and in 
the child’s presence but Justice Akbarali stated that “there is no allegation that the 
child has been harmed by the father.”128 While a temporary joint custody order 
was set aside in light of the abuse allegations, Justice Akbarali refused to give the 
mother temporary sole custody since the allegations had not yet been “properly 
tested” and awarded the father three days per week of unsupervised access.129 
It is understandably difcult to determine custody or to prohibit or limit 
access where the parties have diametrically opposed versions of events that have 
often occurred in private. Tis difculty may be eased by more detailed scrutiny 
of afdavits and uncontested facts, the production of afdavits by third parties, 
expedited custody assessments, trial dates or viva voce hearings, and periodic 
reviews of interim orders. However, all such measures are much more difcult to 
undertake during a pandemic. Unless judges are willing to scrutinize the available 
evidence closely and, as Susan B. Boyd and Ruben Lindy suggest, draw inferences 
based on circumstantial evidence, they may, in awarding unsupervised access or 
almost equal parenting time, end up privileging the fathers’ denial and erring 
on the side of furthering contact rather than exercising caution.130 Tis outcome 
may not only expose children and families to increased COVID-19 related risks 
in the short term but also expose children to coercive control or abuse on a 
long-term basis, as many such claims may not go to trial at all. In this sense, the 
status quo presumption and a pro-contact legal culture systematically prejudice 
claimants who have experienced domestic violence, exposing their children 
to a risk of continuing abuse. Tis is not an inevitable outcome as other cases 
(albeit pre-COVID-19) demonstrate that judges can err on the side of caution in 
127. 2020 ONSC 1979 at para 31 [Amirzada]. 
128. Ibid. See also AMD, supra note 94. In AMD the mother was found to complain of the 
father’s treatment of her, not the children, ignoring the harmful impact of abuse of a mother 
on children (ibid at para 34). 
129. Amirzada, supra note 127 at para 36. Te mother’s request to relocate with the child to 
Vancouver for extended family support during the pandemic was also refused. 
130. “Violence Against Women and the B.C. Family Law Act: Early Jurisprudence” (2016) 
35 CFLQ 101 at 115. For examples of such outcomes in our case sample, see Amirzada, 
supra note 127; Pappas, supra note 97; Amiri, supra note 126; Soares, supra note 124; Silva 
v Silva, 2020 ONSC 3073 [Silva]. In Silva, access was to be supervised by the father’s 
mother or brother. Note that in our sample, allegations of abuse by mothers of fathers, while 
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interim matters where credible evidence suggests signifcant risk, without making 
an afrmative fnding of abuse.131 
In assessing the risk of harm to children in our case sample, judges, as well 
as children’s aid societies, also tended to focus on recent discrete incidents of 
physical violence and ignore or discount the impact of coercive or controlling 
behaviour, including COVID-related control. Te Children’s Aid Society had 
not identifed any “imminent safety concerns” in Amirzada,132 and had closed 
their fle in Batchelor v Batchelor while acknowledging that the three-year-old 
child had been exposed to and emotionally afected by the father’s physical and 
emotional abuse of the mother.133 Generally, very little detail was provided in 
judgments beyond bare allegations of controlling behaviour or emotional and 
psychological abuse. Notably, however, relief appeared far more likely when the 
court could frame coercive control tactics as alienation and as a failure to support 
the mother’s or survivor’s relationship with the children.134 In Flesias, the mother 
had alleged serious fnancial coercion and physical abuse by the father who had 
encouraged one of their children to fle an afdavit denying such violence.135 Based 
on the concern that the father was actively discouraging a relationship between 
the mother and the children, she was awarded primary residence and exclusive 
possession of the family home, but the father obtained unsupervised access two 
to three days per week in spite of “serious concerns” about his behaviour.136 
In Edwards v Robinson, the mother, who claimed to be a victim of domestic 
violence over a twenty-year time span, had been denied contact with the two 
131. See e.g. Malone v Allar, 2014 BCSC 1621 at para 64, SA Grifn J. See also RDM v XMM, 
2017 BCSC 1674; LCT v RK, 2015 BCSC 303. But see LCT v RK, 2015 BCSC 2378, af’d 
2017 BCCA 64 on the parenting issue, where the trial judge found that the mother had 
exaggerated claims of sexual and domestic abuse by the father. 
132. Amirzada, supra note 127 at para 31; Pappas, supra note 97 (expressing no concerns 
from the Society). 
133. Batchelor, supra note 108. 
134. See e.g. McCumber, supra note 95. For discussion of concerns regarding claims of alienation 
in the context of domestic violence, see e.g. Linda Neilson, Parental Alienation Empirical 
Analysis: Child Best Interests or Parental Rights?, (Muriel McQueen Fergusson Centre for 
Family Violence Research and Vancouver: Te FREDA Centre for Research on Violence 
Against Women and Children, 2018); Elizabeth Sheehy & Susan B Boyd, “Penalizing 
Women’s Fear: Intimate Partner Violence and Parental Alienation in Canadian Child 
Custody Cases” (2020) 42 J Soc Welfare & Fam L 80; Suzanne Zaccour, “Parental Alienation 
in Québec Custody Litigation” (2018) 59 C de D 1073; Madelyn S Milchman, Robert 
Gefner & Joan S Meier, “Ideology and Rhetoric Replace Science and Reason in Some 
Parental Alienation Literature and Advocacy: A Critique” (2020) 58 Fam Ct Rev 340. 
135. Flesias, supra note 109. 
136. Ibid at para 44. 













youngest children by the father since the onset of the pandemic.137 Justice Jarvis 
found that the father was likely the partner responsible for the mother’s physical 
injuries as referenced in hospital records, that he had failed to explain his entry 
into a peace bond in 2017, that his complaint to police three months after the 
mother had allegedly uttered threats was “prima facie, suspicious and suggestive 
of a tactical purpose,”138 that he had inappropriately involved the eldest child in 
the dispute, and that his allegation that the mother had substance abuse issues 
was contradicted by a recent hair follicle test. Overall, the father appeared “to be 
taking advantage of the current situation” not by relying on COVID-19 as the 
reason for curtailing access but it seemed by taking advantage of the impediments 
to “timely access to the court” during the COVID-19 pandemic.139 All of this 
conduct is suggestive of ongoing coercive control but unfortunately neither 
the court nor the mother’s counsel identifed this pattern of conduct as having 
or likely to have negative consequences for the children. Justice Jarvis in fact 
praised the mother for not criticizing the father and concluded that there was 
no reason to prefer either parent as a custodial or primary parent until a “more 
robust evidentiary record” was available.140 As requested by her counsel, shared 
parenting was ordered. 
Concerns regarding the insistence by some judges on more robust or “properly 
tested” evidence before taking the risks of domestic violence, including coercive 
control, meaningfully into account are amplifed in the context of COVID-19 
both because of the known increase in risks and because the pandemic has made 
it more difcult to amass evidence in support of one’s claim. Tese difculties 
exist in addition to the challenge of ensuring that all relevant facts have been set 
out in afdavits and of collecting and having them sworn in times of physical 
distancing. In Masse v Phillip, the father alleged that the mother sufered from 
mental health issues that the mother acknowledged but attributed largely to his 
long-term abuse of her.141 Before increasing her access to the children, however, 
Justice Mitrow noted that she needed credible third party information regarding 
her mental health and that this would be difcult to obtain given the pandemic.142 
In Amirzada, the court refused to order a custody and access assessment and 
noted that a report from the Ontario Children’s Lawyer with respect to a young 
137. Edwards, supra note 109. 
138. Ibid at para 7. 
139. Ibid at para 6. 
140. Ibid at para 8. 
141. Masse, supra note 101. 
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child could not be undertaken because of the need to physically distance.143 Few
decisions were able to reference Voices of the Children reports or obtain input 
from children apart from instances where children had been encouraged, most 
often by fathers, to complain about the other parent.144 
Te inaccessibility of services has impeded not only the gathering of 
relevant evidence but has also limited the outcomes available in custody and 
access disputes. In “normal” times, supervised access may be available until trial 
if survivors can prove that restricted access is in the best interests of the child, 
generally by way of evidence that the risk of harm to the child outweighs the 
benefts of an open relationship with the other parent.145 Supervised access was 
ordered or left in place in only four cases in our sample, suggesting that this 
burden is an onerous one.146 While supervision is more likely to be ordered on a 
short-term basis, with the closure of supervision facilities, COVID-19 also raises 
more starkly questions as to who is a neutral, independent party who can supervise 
visits and whether supervision can be undertaken without increasing exposure of 
143. Amirzada, supra note 127. 
144. See e.g. Flesias, supra note 109; Edwards, supra note 109; McCumber, supra note 95. See 
also Tibert, supra note 124 (where the father had “allegedly enlisted one of the children to 
participate in an event designed to humiliate and degrade the mother” at para 5); Triestino, 
Motion Order, supra note 97; Triestino, Motion Ruling, supra note 97. 
145. GJ v B-LS, supra note 108 at para 1, citing Young v Young, [1993] 4 SCR 3. Note too 
that in addition to being supervised, access may be made conditional upon participation 
in counselling by the abusive parent; however, none of the judgments in our case sample 
included such an order. 
146. McNeil, supra note 109; Tibert, supra note 124; Silva, supra note 130; Triestino, Motion 
Order, supra note 97 (application for supervised access found to be urgent); Triestino, 
Motion Ruling, supra note 97 (supervision by the paternal grandparents subsequently 
found inefective in preventing harassment of the mother by the father). See also Tibodeau, 
supra note 89 (where the father did not respond to the application and the children were 
ordered to be returned to the mother). See Michael Saini & Rachel Birnbaum, “Raising Te 
Bar: A Risk Assessment Checklist When Supervised Access Is Being Considered in Child 
Custody Disputes” (2015) 34 CFLQ 335. Saini and Birnbaum identify a host of problems 
with supervised access including little monitoring or follow up, little attention to children’s 
experience and comfort levels, and a lack of accreditation for providers and access centres. 
See Fiona Kelly, “Enforcing a Parent-Child Relationship At All Cost? Supervised Access 
Orders in the Canadian Courts” (2011) 49 Osgoode Hall LJ 277 at 308 (fnding in an 
analysis of decisions in Ontario and BC between 2006-2007 that even in cases of serious 
spousal or child abuse, judges “almost always” presumed that supervised access was in the 
best interests of children). 
(2020) 57 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
   
 
  




   
 
  
   




the child or others to COVID-19.147 In the Amirzada decision discussed above,148 
the father’s unsupervised access was presumed safe in part because the father 
resided with four other adult family members who had a close relationship with 
the child. Te mother’s request to fy with the child to Vancouver to be with her 
extended family was denied, among other reasons, because of the risk arising 
from non-essential travel to the child and the public during the pandemic149 but 
physical distancing measures in relation to the father’s extended family while the 
child was in his care were not addressed. Family members of the alleged abuser 
may often be identifed for a supervisory role,150 but since the point of supervision 
is to watch out for problematic or harmful interactions with children, they are 
likely to be conficted about reporting such problems and their participation may 
also increase the risks of surveillance of a victim by an abuser.151 Telephone or 
virtual access was ordered in relatively few cases in our sample152 and in any case, 
would likely be problematic with very young children.153 In only one of the cases 
reviewed was an application for access completely denied, and this was ordered 
on a temporary without prejudice basis where the father was in custody as a result 
of an assault charge.154 
147. Triestino, Motion Ruling, supra note 97. In Triestino, Motion Ruling the mother applied to 
vary a temporary order giving the father in-person access to their two children, which was 
supervised in the paternal grandparents’ home. Te father repeatedly texted and emailed the 
mother while the children were with him on access visits during the pandemic, leading to 
charges of criminal harassment and breach of a restraining order. Justice Jarvis granted the 
mother’s request to suspend in-person access “until supervised access facilities are permitted 
to re-open safely” and ordered access by the father via videocalls with the children in the 
interim, to be initiated by the mother (ibid at para 16). 
148. Amirzada, supra note 127. 
149. Ibid at para 31. But see EL v ND, 2020 QCCS 1451 (allowing the father to return to France 
with the children and acknowledging COVID-19 impacts only in relation to a potential 
delay in travel plans). 
150. See e.g. Silva, supra note 130 (supervised by the father’s brother or mother); Amirzada, 
supra note 127 (supervised access not needed because the father is living with his extended 
family); Triestino, Motion Ruling, supra note 97 (supervision by paternal grandparents 
found inefective). 
151. See Tibert, supra note 124. In Tibert, the father’s application to have his parents or brother 
supervise access was denied for that reason. See also Rachel Birnbaum, “Virtual Parent-Child 
Contact Post-Separation: Hearing from Multiple Perspectives on the Risks and Rewards” 
(2020) 39 CFLQ 75. 
152. See e.g. Triestino, Motion Ruling, supra note 97; Triestino, Motion Order, supra note 97. 
153. See the text accompanying note 165. 
154. Harrington v Dennison, 2020 ONSC 2114 [Harrington]. In Harrington, the father was 
charged with assault causing bodily harm to the mother by reason of strangulation while the 
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In summary, COVID-19 has arguably rendered underlying systemic issues 
in parenting cases more visible. Te “settlement mission” has intensifed, with 
parties expected to sort things out themselves irrespective of power diferentials 
and potentially at odds with public norms governing adjudication in family 
law matters. Te public health messages of safety in the home align with the 
ideology of the family, contributing to both the invisibility and imprint of the 
shadow pandemic. Challenges in marshalling proof of domestic violence and 
in accessing services are endemic in the family law realm but have if anything 
increased during the timeframe of our case sample. Given a default assumption 
of contact, coercive control, in many respects the most damaging and corrosive 
form of abuse, is systematically minimized or ignored unless serious physical 
violence or threats have immediately preceded the application. All such concerns 
compromise access by women and children to safety and to equality in family 
violence cases.155 
C. CHILD PROTECTION 
Most provincial and territorial statutes expressly identify children to be in need 
of state protection or intervention where they have been exposed to family, 
interpersonal or domestic violence, or are likely to have been physically or 
emotionally harmed by it.156 During the pandemic, child protection matters have 
generally been more readily acknowledged than private family law cases to be 
“urgent” in court directives. For example, the Ontario Superior Court directive 
included in urgent child protection matters “all urgent or statutorily mandated 
events including the initial hearing after a child has been brought to a place 
of safety, and any other urgent motions or hearings.”157 Te Ontario Court of 
Justice included place of safety hearings, temporary care and custody hearings, 
restraining orders, status review hearings, and secure treatment orders.158 
155. See Te Honourable Donna Martinson & Margaret Jackson, “Family Violence and Evolving 
Judicial Roles: Judges as Equality Guardians in Family Law Cases” (2017) 30 Can J Fam 
L 11 (criticizing the traditional adversarial system and lack of specialized judges in family 
violence cases). 
156. See e.g. Te Child, Youth and Family Services Act 2017, SO 2017, c 14 (CYFSA). See also 
Koshan, Mosher & Wiegers, “Te Costs of Justice,” supra note at 7 at 16-17. 
157. Notice to the Profession, 15 March 2020, supra note 83. 
158. Note that under the authority of section 7.1(2) of the Emergency Management and Civil 
Protection Act, time limits for proceedings were suspended retroactively to 6 March 2020 and 
for the duration of the emergency. See Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act, RSO 
1990, c E-9, s 7.1(2). 











However, COVID-19 has still had a serious impact on the handling of 
child protection matters and, as with many COVID-19 impacts, the parents 
and children most afected are economically disadvantaged. Although we know 
that a disproportionate number of families afected by the child protection 
system are also racialized, Indigenous, and/or living with physical or mental 
disabilities,159 in our sample of eight protection cases, none of the parties were 
identifed as Indigenous and only one family appeared to be racialized. Several 
cases involved parents who were alleged to have substance abuse or mental health 
issues. Potential COVID-19 impacts included reduced oversight or reporting of 
child maltreatment as a result of social isolation as well as reduced opportunities 
for parents to visit their children while in state care or to meet conditions (such 
as counselling or attendance in parenting support programs) that could facilitate 
the return of their children.160 In British Columbia, presentation hearings that 
could identify whether children were in need of protection at the time of removal 
were delayed, with the result that the Ministry’s decisions as to parental care 
could not in the interim be challenged.161 
As well, some children in Ontario have been removed rather than placed 
with their parents under the supervision of a Society because of an inability 
to provide efective supervision during COVID-19. In CAS of Toronto v SS,162 
Judge Zisman found that the mother needed counselling to understand domestic 
violence and its impact on children and to resolve her feelings for the father. 
Nonetheless, the court failed to expressly consider the mother’s “contradictory 
behaviour patterns” (accusing the father of hitting the child but allowing him 
to care for the child and returning to live with him) in light of her experience 
of violence, along with the onerous demands of caring for a child with autism. 
In placing the child in the temporary care of the Society, judicial notice was 
taken of a number of signifcant constraints related to COVID-19: that many 
staf members were working remotely, that no home visits were being conducted, 
and that staf were responding in person only to emergency calls.163 Moreover, 
with schools and day care centres closed, there were no third parties to assist 
in monitoring the well-being of children under the supervision of the Society 
159. For a discussion, see Judith Mosof et al, “Intersecting Challenges: Mothers and Child 
Protection Law in BC” (2017) 50 UBC L Rev 435. 
160. See BC (CFCS) v KS, 2020 BCPC 97 at para 130 (discussing this in obiter). 
161. Re BC (CFCS) v SMS 2020 BCPC 87, DL Dorey Prov CJ (suggesting that an application for 
parens patriae relief could be made to the Supreme Court of British Columbia). 
162. 2020 ONCJ 170 [CAS of Toronto] (decided 2 April 2020). 
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and no community supports for caregivers.164 With minimal oversight and no 
other community supports, the mother, who Judge Zisman found had not been 
open and honest with the Society, could not be relied upon to provide proper 
care. Further, regarding the mother’s access to the child while in state care, there 
were no drivers available to take children to and from visits and foster caregivers 
were concerned about visits in their homes due to the potential for COVID-19 
transmission. Judge Zisman acknowledged that telephone or electronic access 
meant a lack of meaningful contact and bonding between parents and their 
young children.165 Although the court has the statutory authority to establish 
terms and conditions on access as deemed appropriate,166 the Society was given 
the broad discretion to determine the “nature, frequency, duration, location and 
level of supervision.”167 
Likewise in SMCYFS v CB, a supervision order was ruled out and an infant 
child was placed with a maternal aunt under a temporary order because the 
agency had no ability to monitor risks to the infant due to COVID.168 Here 
the mother had separated from an abusive partner but again, as is common 
with domestic violence survivors, was struggling with mental health issues and 
had been diagnosed with PTSD.169 Te mother also lost in-person access to her 
older children who were in the care of the aunt because her access could not be 
supervised due to the closure of supervised access centres and the need to physically 
distance. While the Society was under an obligation to ensure meaningful access 
in alternative ways, and could provide electronic access to the older children, the 
court held that the health and safety of the mother, child, and access supervisor 
were more important than the loss of the mother’s ability to bond with her infant 
through access. Again, the Society was given the discretion to review access on an 
ongoing basis and expand it when deemed safe as a result of COVID. 
164. Ibid at para 126. 
165. Ibid at paras 156-57. 
166. CYFSA, supra note 156, s 94(8). 
167. CAS of Toronto, supra note 162 at para 160. 
168. 2020 ONSC 2109. 
169. See Mosof et al, supra note 159. 






Tere are cases in which the Society’s ability to monitor conditions under 
a supervision order or provide supports was not raised or questioned,170 and as 
of 8 May 2020 the Ontario policy that had suspended in-person access since 
mid-March was lifted. Tere are nonetheless questions as to whether Societies 
should have been given the blanket authority to determine how access was 
to be exercised or alternatively, whether courts should have undertaken an 
individualized assessment of the relative risks. Admittedly, there are risks to 
staf and foster families that must be considered in this context but by contrast 
with the assumptions made by courts in cases involving parenting orders, the 
child’s exposure to persons across more than one household here appears to 
be presumptively problematic. Overall, the implications of COVID-19 for 
women experiencing domestic violence and facing removal of their children by 
child protection agencies have, in the short-term, been profound. Loss of the 
opportunity to parent under supervision or to maintain access with children in 
care can also potentially make it harder for mothers to regain care of the children in 
the longer term. Here we see a very diferent “planet” from the family law planet, 
where the importance of contact with fathers especially is de facto presumed. 
D. CRIMINAL 
Te criminal response to intimate partner violence has evolved over the decades. 
Feminist and anti-violence activists in the 1980s focused on the gendered and public 
harms of domestic violence, but there has been increasing recognition that some 
reforms, such as pro-charging and pro-prosecution policies, disproportionately 
criminalize members of marginalized communities—including poor, racialized 
and Indigenous accused persons, and abused women trying to defend themselves 
170. Children’s Aid Society of Districts of Sudbury and Manitoulin v AH, 2020 ONSC 2704 
[Children’s Aid Society]. See also Protection de la jeunesse —201975, 2020 QCCQ 1814 
[Protection de la jeunesse]. In Children’s Aid Society, decided 30 April 2020, the children were 
allowed to remain in the mother’s care subject to a supervision order with “numerous and 
stringent conditions” imposed by the lower court,” (at para 63). Te mother’s condition 
had stabilized, and any risk of harm was described as speculative. Here too, the Society was 
able to determine how the father’s supervised access was to be conducted. In Protection de 
la jeunesse, the progressive reintegration of a nine-year old child was not possible under the 
emergency conditions in Québec, so the child was returned to the mother with orders “that 
the child receive all health care and services, including any therapeutic service, required by 
his condition,” as well as the services of an educator with access by the father supervised by 
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or their children from violence.171 At the same time, criminal laws may also be 
under-enforced in some communities—including Indigenous communities— 
because police and other justice sector actors minimize or normalize gender-based 
violence.172 In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, these concerns combine 
with the reality that over-crowded prisons are a breeding ground for the virus, 
placing inmates and staf at risk, as well as the reality that the social conditions 
associated with the pandemic, discussed above, place women at greater risk of 
violence.173 Criminal cases during the pandemic thus require a balancing of the 
rights of accused persons and complainants even more so than usual. 
Our sample contained only ffteen relevant criminal cases, which is a 
relatively small number. However, the cases almost all deal with interim release 
(bail) or sentencing, allowing for some common issues to emerge in these areas. 
Tere was only one criminal case that reviewed whether a trial should proceed 
on an urgent basis, which raises concerns about delay in hearing criminal 
matters on the merits.174 Even cases that were to be heard by Domestic Violence 
Courts, which normally fast-track criminal intimate partner violence matters, 
171. See e.g. Claire Houston, “How Feminist Teory Became (Criminal) Law: Tracing the 
Path to Mandatory Criminal Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases” (2014) 21 Mich 
J of Gender & L 217; Leigh Goodmark, “Reframing Domestic Violence Law and Policy: 
An Anti-Essentialist Proposal” (2009) 31 Wash UJL & Pol’y; Aya Gruber, “Te Feminist 
War on Crime” (2007) 92 Iowa L Rev 741; Ananya Bhattacharjee, “Whose Safety? Women 
of Color and the Violence of Law Enforcement” (2001), online (pdf ): <www.afsc.org/ 
sites/default/fles/documents/whose%20safety.pdf> [perma.cc/PH57-S8B6]; Dianne 
Martin & Janet Mosher, “Unkept Promises: Experiences of Immigrant Women with the 
Neo-Criminalization of Wife Abuse” (1995) 8 CJWL 3. 
172. See e.g. Reclaiming Power and Place: Te Final Report of the National Inquiry into Missing 
and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls (2019), online (pdf ): <www.mmiwg-fada. 
ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Final_Report_Vol_1a-1.pdf> [perma.cc/6XF7-6CET]; 
Elizabeth Comack & Gillian Balfour, Te Power to Criminalize: Violence, Inequality and the 
Law (Fernwood, 2004) at 153. 
173. See e.g. Jane Philpott & Kim Pate, “Time running out to protect prisoners and prison staf 
from calamity” (31 March 2020), online: Policy Options <policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/ 
march-2020/time-running-out-to-protect-prisoners-and-prison-staf-from-calamity> 
[perma.cc/2BHJ-3ER7]. 
174. See R c Dallaire, 2020 QCCQ 1699 (fnding that a trial should proceed urgently after 
reviewing a number of factors, including the possible reluctance of the Inuit victim to testify 
if there was further delay (at para 19)). 









have not been treated as necessarily “urgent” during the pandemic.175 Like the 
other areas of law we discuss in this article, given the time frame of our case 
law search, most of the reported criminal cases involved alleged ofences that 
occurred pre-COVID-19.176 Not refected here are the decisions made by other 
state actors, such as police and Crown prosecutors, about whether to charge or 
prosecute particular cases of intimate partner violence in light of COVID-19 
considerations. 
Although there is no specifc ofence of domestic violence in the Criminal 
Code, bail and sentencing are two areas of criminal law where there are explicit 
considerations for intimate partner violence. Interim release of an accused is 
normally assumed, based on the presumption of innocence, unless the Crown can 
prove that detention is necessary to ensure the attendance of the accused in court 
(primary grounds), for protection or safety of the public (secondary grounds), 
or to maintain public confdence in the administration of justice—which 
includes consideration of the gravity of, and the circumstances surrounding, the 
ofence (tertiary grounds).177 Recent amendments to the Criminal Code require 
judges to consider whether the accused is charged with an ofence in which 
“violence was used, threatened or attempted against their intimate partner” when 
deciding upon interim release.178 If so, and the accused was previously convicted 
of an ofence related to intimate partner violence, the burden will be on them 
to show cause why they should be released.179 In cases involving sentencing, the 
presumption of innocence no longer applies, and courts must balance a range 
of objectives and principles. Te abuse of an intimate partner is an aggravating 
factor and sentencing courts in cases involving intimate partner violence must 
175. See Mattoo & Butt, supra note 19 at 9. Tere was one case in our sample that was identifed 
as being heard in Toronto’s Integrated Domestic Violence Court (IDVC), but that was 
regarding a family matter involving access rather than a criminal matter. See Livingstone v 
Cooper, 2020 ONCJ 174. For a discussion of the IDVC, see Rachel Birnbaum, Michael Saini 
& Nicholas Bala, “Canada’s First Integrated Domestic Violence Court: Examining Family 
and Criminal Court Outcomes at the Toronto IDVC” (2017) 32 J Fam Violence 621. 
176. For an exception, see R v Dagher, 2020 ONSC 2592 [Dagher] (accused charged with assault 
against his wife alleged to have occurred during COVID). See also the text accompanying 
notes 185, 193, and 203. 
177. Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 515(10) [Criminal Code]. See also R v St Cloud, 2015 
SCC 27 [St Cloud]. 
178. Criminal Code, supra note 177, s 515(3)(a). 
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“consider the increased vulnerability of female persons who are victims, giving 
particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal female victims.”180 
In the bail and sentencing decisions during our timeframe, the urgency of 
hearing the matter was typically assumed.181 Tis is not surprising, considering 
that the person accused or found guilty in all of these cases was being detained 
in custody, and in-custody criminal matters were generally classifed as urgent by 
courts across the country.182 
R v Mitchell is the only case in our sample where the court explicitly addressed 
the importance of not delaying the hearing of intimate partner violence cases 
during the COVID-19 pandemic. In his decision, Judge Gorman notes that the 
Provincial Court of Newfoundland and Labrador had recently announced that 
it would hear all matters that can be “efciently and efectively presented for 
adjudication without the need for the physical presence of any person.” In what 
was perhaps a subtle rebuke of the Crown, he stated:183 
Victims of intimate violence are often very vulnerable and the Pandemic has 
increased their vulnerability. Cases involving intimate violence should not be placed 
on hold when the Court has the technology and has expressed a willingness to hear 
additional matters… Tere is no longer any reason for the Crown failing to bring 
matters forward. By delaying matters that can be heard, the Crown is denying access 
to justice for accused persons, complainants and victims. 
Te key issue in the reported criminal decisions is the extent to which courts 
balance any risk of contracting COVID-19 in jail with the risk of (further) harm 
to complainants. Courts have also been required to balance other concerns raised 
by the pandemic, such as trial delay or harsher incarceration conditions, with 
complainant safety concerns. Tese considerations can arise in several ways: (1) 
180. Ibid, ss 718.2, 718.201. See also s 718.3(8) (providing for increased sentences for subsequent 
intimate partner violence ofences); ss 109(1)(a.1)(i), 109(2) (a mandatory weapons 
prohibition order for at least ten years in IPV cases). 
181. For an exception, see R v Cook, 2020 ONSC 2055 (bail hearing in midst of trial was found 
to be urgent, no decision on merits is available). 
182. See e.g. Ontario Superior Court of Justice, “Consolidated Notice to the Profession, Litigants, 
Accused Persons, Public and the Media” (13 May 2020), online: <www.ontariocourts. 
ca/scj/notices-and-orders-covid-19/consolidated-notice/#1_Urgent_Civil_and_Family_ 
Proceedings> [perma.cc/4B4L-U23M] (urgent criminal matters include: bail, bail 
review, detention review, guilty pleas, and sentencing for in-custody persons in urgent 
circumstances). 
183. R v Mitchell, 2020 CanLII 33884 [Mitchell] at paras 4, 5. 










in the review of grounds for release of the accused;184 (2) when an accused seeks 
review of an earlier bail decision based on a material change in circumstances, 
which—if proved—allows for a reconsideration of the primary, secondary, and 
tertiary grounds;185 and (3) in sentencing decisions, as relevant to the amount of 
credit for pre-trial custody that is seen as appropriate, or as otherwise relevant to 
the accused’s sentence.186 
Similar to the family law and child protection cases discussed above, courts 
have taken varying approaches to requiring actual evidence of the risks related 
to COVID-19 in both bail and sentencing decisions. Tis is a key concern in 
the intimate partner violence context. Because release of the accused may pose 
corresponding safety risks to the complainant and perhaps children,187 we might 
184. See R v Swierkot, 2020 QCCQ 1926 at paras 71-75 [Swierkot] (reverse onus case under 
s 515(6)(b.1), accused detained on all three grounds, COVID seen to have little impact 
because there were no specifc concerns related to accused’s health or prison in question); 
R v Sangster, 2020 ONCA 332 [Sangster] (see the text accompanying notes 187, 200-201). 
185. See Criminal Code, supra note 177, s 520; St Cloud, supra note 177 para 139. For cases where 
a material change was found, see R v Fraser, 2020 ONSC 2045 [Fraser] (reasoning based on 
specifc risk of COVID-19 at Ottawa Carleton Detention Centre, where accused was housed 
in dorm with ten to twelve people and was in remission from leukemia, he was nevertheless 
detained on the secondary ground given his “capability for signifcant violence… that … 
is regularly directed toward women in his life” (at para 20)); R v Medeiros, 2020 ONSC 
2890 [Medeiros] (reasoning based on judicial notice of risks of contracting COVID-19 in 
prison and trial delay. Te accused was detained on secondary grounds in light of his violent 
criminal record and concern for the safety of the complainant, even though the sentence 
would likely be less than time detained (at paras 12-13)); Dagher, supra note 176 (reasoning 
that COVID-19 was relevant to trial delay that would likely result in the accused being 
detained in pre-trial custody longer than any sentence he might receive (at para 20)). For a 
case where a material change based on COVID-19 was assumed, see R v BTD, 2020 NSSC 
165 [BTD] (the accused was detained on secondary and tertiary grounds (at para 25)). For 
cases where the Crown conceded a material change in circumstances based on COVID-19, 
see R v Rajan, 2020 ONSC 2118 [Rajan] (see the text accompanying notes 190 to 194); 
R v PS, 2020 ONSC 2186 [PS] (accused released on “very strict house arrest” with electronic 
monitoring (at para 8)). 
186. See e.g. R v OK, 2020 ONCJ 189 [OK] (reasoning the accused was to be given extra 
credit of 0.5 days for every day served during the COVID-19 crisis for “particularly harsh 
conditions” in the Toronto South Detention Centre (at para 41)); R v Durance, 2020 ONCJ 
236 [Durance] (reasoning that there would be no increase in credit for pre-trial custody, but 
sentence reduced based on worse experience of incarceration during COVID-19, although 
the amount of reduction unclear (at para 62)); R v Studd, 2020 ONSC 2810 [Studd] 
(accused was at high risk for contracting COVID-19 and jail conditions were harsher than 
usual; sentence reduced by four months (at para 44)). 
187. Children are rarely mentioned in the criminal cases. For exceptions, see Sangster, supra note 
184 (noting that the accused and complainant have a child together, born while the accused 
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expect courts to require an evidentiary basis for the risks related to COVID-19. 
Tis expectation is fulflled in several cases, where courts were not prepared 
to assume that the risk of contracting COVID-19 in prison was a signifcant 
consideration unless there was evidence the accused faced a specifc risk because 
of health conditions and/or because of an outbreak in the facility in which they 
were or would be incarcerated.188 
In other cases, courts were more willing to make assumptions about the 
risks to the accused, often taking judicial notice of the impact of COVID-19 
in prisons.189 For example, in the much-cited case of R v Rajan, the accused 
was charged with break, enter and commit assault, death threats, and criminal 
harassment in relation to several alleged incidents involving his former intimate 
partner. He was also charged with discharging a frearm into the complainant’s 
home, where a bullet hole was found that matched a handgun discovered in his 
apartment pursuant to a search warrant. However, the gun was excluded from 
evidence at a pre-trial Charter application. In a bail review hearing, the Crown 
conceded that there was a material change in circumstances based on both the 
exclusion of the frearm and COVID-19, but sought to detain the accused based 
on the secondary grounds and concerns about the risk he posed towards the 
complainant. Justice Harris decided that while the charges against the accused 
were “troubling,” the Crown’s case was “substantially diminished” due to the 
exclusion of the frearm, and the risk to the complainant could be managed by 
releasing the accused with conditions to have no contact with her and to submit 
to house arrest (residing with his mother as surety) and electronic monitoring.190 
On the tertiary grounds, Justice Harris discussed the risks of contracting 
COVID-19 in jail at some length, but for the most part this was based on general 
evidence rather than the specifc risk to the accused, and discounted the Crown’s 
evidence about the steps being taken to prevent the spread of COVID-19 in 
Ontario’s correctional institutions.191 It is concerning how the consideration 
188. See e.g Swierkot, supra note 184 at para 82; Fraser, supra note 185 at paras 13-14; Durance, 
supra note 186, paras 53-56. 
189. See e.g. Medeiros, supra note 185 (judicial notice taken of the risks of contracting COVID-19 
in prison); PS, supra note 185 (judicial notice taken of the risks of contracting COVID-19 
for the accused with underlying health conditions). 
190. Rajan, supra note 185 at paras 22, 23, 28-35. For other cases involving a consideration of 
electronic surveillance as a risk management tool, see Fraser, supra note 185; PS, supra note 
185; Swierkot, supra note 184. See also BTD, supra note 185 (discussing the new availability 
of electronic monitoring in Nova Scotia as of 1 May 2020, although it is unclear if this was a 
policy change due to COVID-19). 
191. Rajan, supra note 185 at paras 36-74. Te Court did note that the accused has an 
auto-immune disease (psoriasis) but this was not a major focus (ibid at para 63). 












of maintaining public confdence in the administration of justice weighs more 
heavily in favour of public concerns about a relatively abstract risk of the accused 
contracting COVID-19 in prison (though the court says this risk “is based on 
cold, hard scientifc reality”) rather than public concerns about the more concrete 
risks to the safety of the complainant, even without the handgun as evidence.192 
Te court’s brief references to domestic violence reinforce the concerns noted 
above in the family law section about conceptualizing this violence primarily as 
discrete physical acts, as well as portraying the violence as a mutual problem.193 
Moreover, the court’s alarmist description of the COVID-19 pandemic—as 
dire, extraordinary, the virus as highly contagious, causing very serious illness 
or death—contrasts sharply with the muted attention given to the risk and 
harms of domestic violence. Justice Harris’s conclusion that jail is “one of the 
most dangerous places imaginable”194 during the pandemic obfuscates the 
reality that the home, for victims of abuse, is far more dangerous than prison. 
While the COVID-19 pandemic is rendered as extraordinary and dangerous, 
the pandemic of violence against women is obscured, relegated to the mundane 
and common place. 
In contrast, there are other cases where courts place more weight on the 
risks of intimate partner violence if the accused is released,195 but only one case 
where the increased risk of domestic violence due to COVID-19 is specifcally 
addressed. In Mitchell, discussed above, Judge Gorman undertook a detailed 
192. Rajan, supra note 185 at para 68. 
193. Ibid (“[d]omestic relationships which go sour have a notorious tendency to engender violent 
emotions. Te positive emotional bonds of afection and love when they are reversed can lead 
to acts of violence and aggression” at para 22). See also Dagher, supra note 176 (noting that 
the accused has no criminal record or history of “actual” violence (at paras 25-26)); PS, supra
note 185 (where there is very little discussion of domestic violence or multiple breaches of 
no-contact orders, rather the focus is on the accused and the risk of COVID-19). 
194. Rajan, supra note 185 at para 56. 
195. BTD, supra note 185 (bail; noting that the accused has an unstable mental state in the 
presence of young children, bail denied but not related to COVID-19 risks (at para 
124)); Fraser, supra note 185 (bail; noting that the accused “refects a capability for 
signifcant violence … regularly directed toward women in his life” but does not mention 
COVID-related risks of violence (at para 20)); Medeiros, supra note 185 (bail; expressing 
general concern for the safety of the complainant, and notes that the accused does not 
have a plan for where to reside if released (at para 40)); Durance, supra note 186 (rejecting 
conditional sentence based on the ofender’s “extensive history of disregard for court orders 
and violence” at paras 14, 72); OK, supra note 186 (sentence; discussing, generally, the 
distribution of intimate images as form of abuse, control, and the degrading nature of other 
assaults (at paras 18-20)); Studd, supra note 186 (sentence; noting several aggravating factors 
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analysis of the sentencing principles applicable to intimate partner violence cases, 
as well as the impact of COVID-19 on sentencing, noting in particular the risks 
to victim safety caused by the loss of shelter spaces due to the pandemic.196 Te 
accused was sentenced to 180 days in jail with a one year period of probation, 
with the risk of contracting COVID-19 in jail found to be relevant to parole 
rather than sentence.197 
Mitchell illustrates another issue in the decisions, namely the loss of services 
and supports due to COVID-19, which can impact the interests of both accused 
persons and complainants. Similar to the recognition of lack of shelter spaces for 
victims noted in Mitchell, in R v Reimer, the British Columbia Court of Appeal 
noted that the presence of COVID-19 would “greatly restrict Mr. Reimer’s ability 
to fnd accommodation” and removed a probation condition for advance approval 
of housing in his sentence appeal.198 On the protective side of the balance, the 
court upheld a condition for the accused not to publish any information about 
the complainant via the Internet or social media, and modifed a condition 
designed to protect future intimate partners by requiring him to disclose his 
past criminal convictions to them.199 In R v Sangster, a reverse onus case for 
bail pending appeal, the Court of Appeal for Ontario considered COVID-19 
relevant to the public interest ground because the accused’s convictions related to 
a “longstanding drug and alcohol addiction” that he had largely recovered from 
in custody, but there was now a lack of addiction counselling services available at 
his institution due to the pandemic.200 Although this was not seen as a decisive 
factor, the accused was released on bail pending his appeal of several convictions 
related to violence against his intimate partner, with whom he had reconciled 
and had a child. His release conditions included that he have no contact with 
the complainant without her “prior written orally revocable consent and in the 
presence of another adult.”201 
196. Mitchell, supra note 183, at para 54, citing R v Rich, [2020] NJ No 90 (PC) [Rich]. Judge 
Gorman noted that community-based sentences in cases of intimate partner violence can 
place victims at heightened risk given that access to “protection facilities for such victims can 
be efected (sic) by the Pandemic, potentially increasing their vulnerability” (ibid at 44). Rich
is not included in our sample because it is not a case involving domestic violence. 
197. Mitchell, supra note 183 at paras 55-56. 
198. R v Reimer, 2020 BCCA 102 at paras 92-94. Reimer had been convicted of several ofences 
including “repeated and serious” threats against his ex-partner and breach of a no contact 
condition (ibid at para 60). 
199. Ibid at paras 89, 102. 
200. Sangster, supra note 184 at paras 46-47. 
201. Ibid at para 19. 









Overall, we see an attempt on the part of courts in many cases to balance 
the COVID-related impacts of prison and the loss of services to accused 
persons/ofenders with the safety of complainants/victims. However, apart from 
Mitchell’s attention to the loss of women’s shelters, there is no discussion of the 
COVID-related risks of violence that have been raised in the literature, such 
as those connected to drug and alcohol abuse, unemployment, limited housing 
options and the likely pressures on complainants to take in an accused who has 
been released, notwithstanding no-contact conditions. To return to the concerns 
about criminalization noted at the outset of this section, there is also little 
mention of the marginalized circumstances of accused persons or victims in these 
cases, and how that might infuence COVID-related risks. Surprisingly in light 
of the over-criminalization of Indigenous persons in Canada, there are no cases 
in our sample where the accused was identifed as Indigenous.202 In the one case 
where it was noted that the accused was racialized, the court declined to take 
judicial notice that he was at higher risk of contracting COVID-19 in prison 
because he was of African descent, fnding that this argument lacked a proper 
evidentiary foundation.203 
E. EMERGENCY PROTECTION ORDERS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS 
Among the key measures recommended by various international bodies to 
address the shadow pandemic is that states take measures to ensure women have 
meaningful access to EPOs.204 Most provinces and territories have domestic 
violence civil protection order legislation, which allows victims of family 
violence to obtain EPOs without notice to the other party in circumstances of 
urgency. Canadian jurisdictions difer in defnitions of family violence, coverage 
202. Our search did uncover Spotted Eagle, a sentencing decision that discusses violence against 
Indigenous women, but COVID-19 was only mentioned in passing as relevant to the court’s 
pandemic-related procedures. See R v Spotted Eagle, 2020 ABPC 70 [Spotted Eagle]. See also 
Dallaire, supra note 174 (involving an Inuit complainant). 
203. Durance, supra note 186 at paras 53, 56. See also Dagher, supra note 176 (noting that the 
accused was originally from Lebanon, with no further discussion). 
204. Human Rights Watch, supra note 23; United Nations Development Programme Brief, 
“Gender-Based Violence and COVID-19” (11 May 2020) at 3, online (pdf ): <www.undp. 
org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/womens-empowerment/gender-based-violence-
and-covid-19.html> [perma.cc/C66S-YTQU] [United Nations Development Program]; 
United Nations Human Rights Ofce of the High Commissioner, News Release, “States 
must combat domestic violence in the context of COVID-19 lockdowns – UN rights 
expert” (27 March 2020), online: <www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews. 
aspx?NewsID=25749&LangID=E> [perma.cc/DJR2-6UM3] [UN Human Rights, 
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of non-familial relationships, and application procedures.205 Alberta appears 
to be the only jurisdiction that changed its protection order procedures in 
response to COVID-19. As noted earlier, it provided legal aid duty counsel to 
assist applicants, including through an after-hours service. Alberta also allowed 
applications for EPOs to be made by victims via telecommunication during the 
pandemic, whereas previously they had to apply in person or have an authorized 
person apply on their behalf.206 Tere was some anecdotal evidence of confusion 
in implementing these changes, which calls into question the accessibility of 
protective orders; nevertheless, these were still positive government initiatives that 
should be explored as longer term policies.207 Te change to allowing applications 
by telecommunication would also be consistent with EPO procedures in some 
other provinces,208 and is a good example of how the pandemic could provide 
impetus for broader reform to legal remedies for domestic violence. Accessibility 
of protective orders should be a goal of governments and courts in “normal” 
times and not just a pandemic-related benchmark. 
Most provinces and territories with civil protection order legislation 
have procedures for review of EPOs, either on application by the claimant or 
respondent, or automatically within a certain period of time after the order was 
granted, with notice to the respondent.209 EPO reviews were explicitly classifed 
as “urgent” in some jurisdictions during the COVID-19 pandemic, and were 
205. For a discussion see Koshan, Mosher & Wiegers, “Te Costs of Justice,” supra note 7 at 13-14. 
206. See Ministerial Order No 2020-011 (Community and Social Services) (April 7, 2020); 
Protection Against Family Violence Regulation, Alta Reg 80/1999, s 4 (previously allowing 
applications via telecommunication only by “designated persons” (e.g. peace ofcers and child 
protection workers)) and now allowing victims to apply by telecommunication.  
207. For a relevant discussion, see Mark Cherrington, “Have to say, the Emergency Protection 
Order process during #COVID19 in #YEG has been a terrible experience. Mom calls to 
make an application, they tell her to go to court. I take mom to court, they tell us can’t 
help & to call. Now she is applying online. #abpoli #ableg” (21 May 2020, 18:45), online 
(Twitter): <twitter.com/MarkCherrington/status/1263601869139505152?s=20> [perma.cc/ 
GZ6H-U7PA] (exchanging with Sarah Eadie). 
208. See e.g. Intimate Partner Violence Intervention Act, SNB 2017, c 5, s 3(2). 
209. See e.g. Family Violence Protection Act, SNL 2005, c F-3.1, ss 9-10 [FVPA] (applicant 
and respondent can apply for variation or termination of EPO); Protection Against 
Family Violence Act, RSA 2000, c P-27 (PAFVA), s 2(6) (automatic review within nine 
working days of EPO). 
(2020) 57 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
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implicitly included in others.210 However, there is only one reported decision in 
this area during our timeframe, which may be in keeping with the pre-pandemic 
status quo, where EPO reviews are often disposed of without written reasons 
(and which, again, raises transparency and accountability concerns).211 
Te reported EPO review case, MP v NJ, is interesting in the extent to which 
the COVID-19 pandemic is not discussed.212 In this case, a woman (NJ) had 
obtained a sixty-day EPO against her ex-partner (MP) in April 2020 that required 
that MP have no contact with her or their two children. Te circumstances that 
supported the EPO were provided in a sworn application made by NJ’s counsel, 
and included evidence of coercive controlling behaviour by MP before and during 
the pandemic.213 Judge Gorman of the Provincial Court of Newfoundland and 
Labrador—who also decided Mitchell, discussed above—allowed the respondent’s 
application to set aside the EPO because the original evidence to support the 
order was defcient in that it did not include a sworn statement by the victim, 
as required under the relevant legislation. Based on the evidence adduced on the 
application to set aside the EPO—which included evidence from the father, but 
not the mother—Judge Gorman also wasn’t satisfed that there were grounds for 
the EPO to continue in force.214 Similar to the family law cases discussed above, 
there was little acknowledgement of the difculty of marshalling evidence during 
the pandemic—in this case, the challenge for lawyers to obtain sworn afdavits 
from their clients. Judge Gorman also downplayed the alleged domestic violence 
by stating that “obtaining of an emergency protection order should not become a 
substitute for resort to the family court for issues involving custody and access of 
children.”215 While allegations that EPOs are used to gain an advantage in family 
210. See e.g. Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta, “Master Order #3 Relating To Court’s Response 
To Te Covid-19 Virus” (April 21, 2020), Appendix D, online (pdf ): <www.albertacourts. 
ca/docs/default-source/qb/covid/master-order-3---covid-19---fnal.pdf?sfvrsn=c4c68280_8> 
[perma.cc/S3HV-TQGF] (listing EPO reviews explicitly as “Matters of Highest Priority 
Requiring Immediate Attention”); Supreme Court of Newfoundland and Labrador, “Notice 
to the Profession and General Public: Covid-19: Preventative Measures” (March 18, 2020), 
online: <court.nl.ca/supreme/pdf/2020%2003%2018%20-%20Notice%20to%20the%20 
Profession%20-%20COVID-19%20Preventative%20Measures.pdf> (“requests for urgent 
relief relating to the safety of a child or parent” included as “urgent and emergency family 
matters” at 4(4.1)(a)). 
211. For a family law case that mentions an unreported EPO review, see AMD, supra note 94 at 
para 20 (resolving the matter with “mutual restraining orders”). 
212. 2020 CanLII 29335 (NL PC) [MP v NJ]. 
213. Ibid at paras 40-41. Te behaviours included forbidding NJ from speaking to her family, 
contacting child protection authorities, and taking photos and videos of her home. 
214. Ibid at paras 11, 14-15. See also FVPA, supra note 209, s 4(4). 
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law proceedings are not new, this sort of statement may dissuade victims from 
pursuing protective legal remedies during the pandemic or otherwise. 
Ontario does not have civil protection order legislation, but it provides for 
restraining orders in family legislation.216 Restraining orders were classifed as 
“urgent” by Ontario courts during the pandemic, and while there are twelve 
family law cases in our sample that discuss such orders, they were not the main 
issue in most of these cases.217 
Te one exception is Harrington v Dennison, where the court dealt with an ex 
parte application for a restraining order by a woman whose ex-partner had been 
charged with several violent ofences against her in February 2020.218 Although 
he was in custody, the applicant feared that he was about to be released, and 
sought a restraining order to protect herself and their sixteen-month-old child, 
as well as a police enforcement clause. Based on the applicant’s sworn afdavit, 
Justice Madsen of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice found the matter to be 
urgent and granted the restraining order on a temporary without prejudice basis. 
Te court does not discuss the alleged violence in much detail, perhaps because 
the allegations were serious and were said to have occurred while the applicant 
was holding the child.219 
216. Family Law Act, RSO 1990, c F.3, s 46; Children’s Law Reform Act, supra note 77. Neither 
does Québec have specifc civil protection order legislation, but the Code of Civil Procedure, 
provides for protection orders in the context of violence more broadly. See Code of Civil 
Procedure, CQLR c C-25.01 [Code of Civil Procedure]. Tere were no relevant cases from 
Québec involving protection order issues during our timeframe. 
217. See “COVID-19 Pandemic – Scheduling of Family Matters in the Ontario Court of 
Justice” (7 May 2020), online: Ontario Court of Justice <www.ontariocourts.ca/ocj/covid-19/ 
covid-19-family-matters-may7> [perma.cc/CNF5-HRJG] [Ontario Court of Justice, 
“Scheduling of Family Matters”]; Ontario Superior Court of Justice, “Consolidated Notice 
to the Profession,” supra note 84. Both Ontario Court of Justice, “Scheduling of Family 
Matters” and Ontario Superior Court of Justice, “Consolidated Notice to the Profession” 
included restraining orders as urgent matters. 
218. Harrington, supra note 154. Te ofences included assault causing bodily harm, strangulation, 
assault, and a historical assault against the mother (ibid at para 6). 
219. For a diferent result, see Amirzada, supra note 127 (dismissing the mother’s request for a 
restraining order as there was a criminal no-contact order in place that was not likely to 
expire soon (at para 42)). 












Te remainder of the cases involved restraining orders made by courts in 
their resolution (usually interim) of parenting time and access issues.220 In most 
of these cases, the focus is on mutually restraining the conduct of both parents 
rather than restraining the conduct of abusers, once again failing to recognize 
the impact of domestic violence on mothers and children and the increased risk 
factors for violence presented by COVID-19. 
Although there are a greater number of cases involving restraining orders 
than those dealing with civil protection orders, there are nevertheless fewer 
reported cases than we might expect during the pandemic, and that is cause for 
concern. Tis is especially so for Alberta given the introduction by Legal Aid 
Alberta of new specialized and after-hours duty counsel services to respond to 
the increased demands for EPOs during COVID-19. It may also be the case 
that courts are not writing reasons for decision here, or that domestic violence 
survivors requiring protective orders are not coming to the courts during the 
pandemic—even though they clearly meet urgency criteria. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Te COVID-19 pandemic quickly thrust the world into uncharted territory. It has 
garnered very signifcant global, national, and local attention and massive public 
resources. Its severe health consequences have led to bold measures, including 
emergency orders suspending all but essential services, the closing of borders 
(including borders internal to Canada), requirements of physical distancing 
outside of one’s household, and in some instances, mandating individuals to 
remain in their homes. But the COVID-19 virus threatens more than the health 
of individuals. It has led to signifcant unemployment, economic vulnerability, 
the proliferation of xenophobic and racist discourses, and increased isolation. 
As we have detailed in Part I, above, it has also led to an increase in domestic 
violence, the shadow pandemic. 
220. See Flesias, supra note 109 (restraining the parties from talking to their children about each 
other or the litigation); Masse, supra note 101; Berube, supra note 86 (restraining the parties 
from speaking negatively about each other); MPM v ALM, 2020 ONSC 1862 (restraining 
the parties from recording their interactions); CKM v LOS, 2020 BCPC 101; Amiri, supra
note 126; Jordan v Steele, 2020 ONSC 2834; Soares, supra note 124; TP v CS, 2020 ONCJ 
210 (restraining, generally, the parties from communicating except regarding children, 
or only allowing to communicate in writing). See also Triestino, Motion Ruling, supra note 
97 (based on new criminal harassment charges, concerns from the Children’s Aid Society, and 
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As noted in the Introduction, above, UN Secretary-General Guterres has 
called on all governments to put women’s safety frst as they respond to the 
COVID-19 pandemic. While by no means exhaustive of the measures necessary to 
ensure women’s safety, meaningful access to the legal system is critically important 
in responding to this call and has been recommended by various international 
bodies.221 Our review of measures taken and judicial decisions rendered in the 
frst six weeks of the COVID-19 pandemic reveals that while some positive 
measures were introduced by governments and court ofcials, survivors’ access to 
the courts and to justice were hampered by a range of obstacles that existed long 
before COVID-19, as well as by some of the particular measures taken. As such, 
our review points to reforms that are needed not only to address the ongoing 
COVID-19 pandemic and the increase in domestic violence that is anticipated to 
exist well beyond the life of COVID-19, or to respond more efectively to future 
viral pandemics, but to ensure access to justice for women and children impacted 
by the ongoing pandemic of violence against women. 
While the inclusion by courts across the country of matters related to the safety 
of a parent or child and access to protection or restraining orders in defnitions of 
“urgency” was a positive development, our review of reported decisions points to 
a number of potential concerns.222 As we suggested above, the strict and narrow 
defnition of urgency may have operated to dissuade lawyers and self-represented 
litigants from proceeding.223 In the decisions on urgency—as with other decisions 
reviewed—there is little evidence that knowledge of the shadow pandemic has 
infltrated judicial decision making. Te courts’ approach to defning urgent 
matters as those that were immediate, imminent, material, and tangible aligns 
with an understanding of domestic violence as discrete incidents of physical 
violence, obscuring both the many tactics that coalesce into patterns of coercive 
control and the heightened risks associated with COVID-19. In the criminal 
law context, urgency was most often assessed in relation to judicial interim 
221. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 23; United Nations Development Program, supra
note 204; UN Human Rights, “domestic violence in the context of COVID-19 lockdowns,” 
supra note 204. 
222. We have noted during the course of our research that as directives have been updated or 
replaced, earlier versions are not available on court websites. For research and other purposes, 
it is important that these directives be archived and we are hopeful that courts may undertake 
this initiative. 
223. As noted earlier, additional data is needed regarding the number of applications made, 
granted, and denied. In addition, qualitative research with lawyers and other frontline service 
providers would yield a more complete picture regarding the barriers to, and facilitators of, 
access to the courts during the COVID-19 pandemic. 








release; only the decision in Mitchell224 noted the increased risks of domestic 
violence during the COVID-19 pandemic and highlighted the importance of 
not delaying the hearing of charges in this context.225 Te limited understanding 
of domestic violence and of COVID-related risks refected in these decisions 
points to the need to deepen the education of judges and lawyers. Tis need for 
education has been identifed by many others prior to COVID-19;226 our review 
both echoes these prior calls for domestic violence education and expands the 
scope of such education to include awareness of the increased risks and changing 
tactics associated not only with COVID-19 but other major calamities that 
produce economic and social stressors. 
In the family law and protection order contexts, procedural complexity may 
also have operated to limit access to protection orders and other remedies. And 
while access to legal representation is important in virtually all family law matters 
involving domestic violence, the increased complexity of urgency motions, the 
rapid pace of change, and the challenges of remote participation all point to 
an acute and heightened need for access to representation. As discussed above, 
provinces and territories difered markedly on this score, with some legal aid 
plans—Ontario’s most notably—moving quickly to enhance access, while others 
made no changes at all. 
Judicial decision making and the safety of women and children were also 
hampered by the limited availability of other services. Limited access to medical, 
counselling, mental health, and other services during COVID-19 negatively 
impacted women’s ability to prove domestic violence to the satisfaction of 
decision makers. Tis suggests that which services are deemed “essential” may 
need to be reconsidered with these issues of “proof” in mind, but also that judges 
may need to alter their approach, particularly in the family law context and 
on interim motions, to consistently err on the side of protection rather than 
224. Supra note 183. 
225. Other important data to gather, as noted earlier, relates to police and prosecutorial decision 
making during COVID-19. A particular issue related to service suspension arises in the 
context of domestic violence courts and the heavy reliance on outcomes such as Ontario’s 
Partner Assault Response program. 
226. See e.g. Law Commission of Ontario, Curriculum Modules in Ontario Law Schools: 
A Framework for Teaching About Violence Against Women, (Toronto, August 2012), online 
(pdf ): <www.lco-cdo.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/violence-against-women-modules-
fnal-report.pdf> [perma.cc/5KWA-DJND]; Luke’s Place, “What You Don’t Know Can 
Hurt You: Te importance of family violence screening tools for family law practitioners” 
(Department of Justice Canada, February, 2019), online (pdf ): <www.justice.gc.ca/eng/ 
rp-pr/jr/can-peut/can-peut.pdf> [perma.cc/24H5-RMP8]. See also Neilson, Responding to 
Domestic Violence, supra note 79. Neilson’s book was originally a bench book for judges and is 
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parental access where credible evidence of risk is brought forward. We also hasten 
to point out that while there are no doubt issues of concern regarding proof of 
domestic violence that are COVID-19 specifc, the systematic discounting of the 
credibility of women survivors of domestic violence within the justice system has 
been a longstanding matter of concern.227 
Te lack of access to services impacted judicial decision making in other 
ways as well, often limiting the outcomes available. For example, the lack of 
services in the child welfare context had the efect of severing parental access to 
children in care; the lack of housing alternatives for an accused on judicial interim 
release impacted conditions that could be attached to release; and the closure of 
supervised access centres resulted in a less protective form of supervision (that is, 
supervision provided by family members). Here too, while the lack of services 
was certainly heightened during the time period of our review, it has been a 
matter of ongoing concern. And here too, it is important to consider which 
services are deemed essential. Importantly, across the country violence against 
women shelters were deemed essential, but other services—supervised access, 
child welfare supervision and supports—are among others that are critical to the 
safety of women and children and ought to be characterized as “essential.” 
As we noted at the outset, while there are similarities in approaches across the 
areas of law examined, there are also some signifcant diferences. Te family law 
context, we have argued, is driven by normative commitments to maintaining 
a child’s contact with both parents and to privatized, individualized resolution 
of disagreements. Tese deeply entrenched commitments—which are also seen 
in the protection order context—have served to obfuscate the risks of both 
COVID-19 and domestic violence. In the child welfare context, mothers are 
expected to protect their children from abusive fathers, shifting responsibility to 
mothers alone to ensure the father has no contact (or only that contact permitted 
by child welfare authorities). Given the over-representation of Indigenous and 
African-Canadian children in care, the mothers who are responsibilized228 are 
227. See e.g. Deborah Epstein & Lisa A Goodman, “Discounting Women: Doubting 
Domestic Violence Survivors’ Credibility and Dismissing Teir Experiences” (2019) 167 
U Pa L Rev 399. 
228. We use the term “responsibilized” here in a manner consistent with the literature on 
neo-liberalism to capture the withdrawal of the state’s role in the provision of a range of social 
and other services and the accompanying expectation of individual (or in some instances, 
familial) responsibility. See e.g. Andrew Woolford & Amanda Nelund, “Te Responsibilities 
of the Poor: Performing Neoliberal Citizenship within the Bureaucratic Field” (2013) 87 Soc 
Service Rev 292; John Clark, “New Labour’s Citizens: Activated, Empowered, Resonsibilized, 
Abandoned?” (2005) 25 Critical Soc Pol’y 447; Brenda Cossman & Judy Fudge, eds, 
Privatization, Law, and Te Challenge to Feminism (University of Toronto Press, 2002). 








those who experience profound poverty and social marginalization. Although 
there are only a small number of reported cases that we draw from, they suggest 
a readiness to suspend access and the services necessary to ensure birth parents 
have meaningful involvement in their children’s lives. Te claims of mothers in 
the child welfare context hardly register, especially in comparison to those of 
fathers in the family law context (including those fathers charged with domestic 
assaults). In the child welfare context, the risks associated with COVID-19 
were regarded as sufciently serious to categorically deny birth parents ongoing 
in-person contact with their children. In the family law context, by contrast, 
father’s claims to access were often regarded as “urgent,” warranting the courts’ 
attention and individualized assessments of risk, in which, as noted, the risks 
of both COVID-19 and domestic violence were downplayed. Many of the 
criminal law decisions share with the child welfare decisions grave concern 
about the transmission of COVID-19—in this case, in prisons. Judges in some 
of the decisions are hyper-focused on the dangers COVID-19 poses and their 
assessment of the tertiary ground in particular shows a pre-occupation with the 
risks to the accused or ofender at the expense of complainants. Other decisions, 
by contrast, show more careful calibration of the risks of COVID-19 and of 
domestic violence. 
Hester invoked the notion of the three planets to describe the domains of 
domestic violence work, child protection work, and child contact work; domains 
that roughly align with criminal, child welfare, and family law. She has argued 
that the tensions and contradictions between these domains inhibit the safety 
of women and children.229 Other work in the Canadian context has advanced a 
similar analysis.230 Here too then, while the tensions and contradictions we have 
highlighted in these cases are particular to the COVID-19 context, they refect 
deeply engrained diferences in values and approaches that undermine women’s 
safety, as well as their access to justice. 
229. Hester, supra note 8. 
230. See Koshan, Mosher & Wiegers, “Te Costs of Justice,” supra note 7; Janet Mosher, 
“Grounding Access to Justice Teory and Practice in the Experiences of Women Abused 
by Teir Intimate Partners,” (2015) 32 Windsor YB Access Just 149; Mary Ellen 
Turpel-Lafond, Honouring Kaitlynne, Max and Cordon: Make Teir Voices Heard Now
(Ofce of the Representative for Children and Youth, 2012), online (pdf ): <www.clwk.ca/ 
wp-content/uploads/buddyshared/honouring_kaitlynne.pdf> [perma.cc/9WPU-28L7]; 
Federal-Provincial-Territorial Ad Hoc Working Group on Family Violence, “Making the 
Links in Family Violence Cases: Collaboration among the Family, Child Protection and 
Criminal Justice Systems” (Department of Justice, 2013). 
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Our assessment of Canada’s response to COVID-19 suggests that there 
is much that needs to change going forward as lawyers, court administrators, 
and judges continue to grapple with violence perpetrated against women in 
the on-going and post-pandemic context. But perhaps most signifcantly, 
it underscores just how poorly we have fared in addressing the pre-existing 
pandemic of violence against women: too limited of an understanding of its 
complexity, too little attention to the global (and particular) scale of its harms, 
and too few resources to address it. But it does not have to be this way:231 
A pandemic amplifes and heightens all existing inequalities. Gender inequality 
plagued societies long before COVID-19, but it doesn’t have to defne the response 
to it. Some will argue that we can’t focus on gender equality now. Others will say 
that it can wait until after crisis. But that’s a false choice, as it is a mistake to see them 
as wholly separate. Instead, the pandemic you know well is accelerating the one that 
you also live with, even if you can’t always see it. 
Te answer to improving the health of our societies and the health of our global 
population is the same: “Put women and girls at the center of eforts to recover from 
COVID-19.” 
231. Morse & Anderson, supra note 31. 

